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The idea of a continued Turco-Arab co-existence under the Ottoman Sultanate might 
appear counterfactual or marginal – if not nostalgic – from the sober vantage of know-
ing “the end of history”. The Ottoman Empire neither survived the Great War nor made 
way for a multinational co-existence of Turks and Arabs. For contemporaries, however, 
different models of federalism and multinationalism offered solutions to save the 
Ottoman Empire and safeguard Turco-Arab co-existence. While the federalist ideas of 
Ottoman Arabs are far better known in the academic literature, in regards to Ottoman 
Turks, the commonplace interpretations follow the teleology of the Turkish nation-
state formation. In order to correct this misperception, I will illustrate the existence of 
corresponding Turkish voices and visions of federalism and multinationalism. 
Envisioning Turco-Arab co-existence was a serious feature of policy debates, especially 
in the years of crisis from the Balkan Wars to the settlement of post-Ottoman nation-
states in the aftermath of the First World War.
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Introduction1
“My friend, this country can only survive like the Austro-Hungarian Em -
1 This article was written independently from Adam Mestyan’s forthcoming article “Austria-
Hungary in Ottoman Arabic Political Thought: Ottoman Dualism, Imperial Comparison, and 
Ancillary History, 1867-1914”. I am grateful for the chance to exchange our manuscripts in the 
later stage of revisions. Neither could I fully utilize the most recent and comprehensive con-
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pire.”2 According to the memoirs of Muḥammad Kurd ʿAlī, Cenab Şehabeddin, 
a prominent Ottoman-Turkish writer, uttered these words to his fellow Otto-
man-Syrian journalist while they were participating in an Ottoman propagan-
da tour across the Arab provinces after the outbreak of the Arab Revolt of 1916. 
If we are to believe Muḥammad Kurd ʿAlī’s recollection, their consensus was 
that a new model of imperial co-existence had to be adopted in order to save 
the empire. What they could not have known at that time was that not only the 
Ottoman Empire, whose doom was on everyone’s lips, but also the Habsburg 
Empire would not survive the end of the Great War.3 In a matter of a few years, 
multinational empires would be replaced by a multitude of post-imperial na-
tion-states. But contemporaries like Şehabeddin and Kurd ʿAlī viewed alterna-
tive outcomes on the “horizon of expectation” as possible.4 They saw potential 
in ideas that would later fail or become irrelevant. They considered future 
paths that eventually no one would take or that went nowhere. The idea of a 
continued Turco-Arab co-existence under the Ottoman Sultanate might there-
fore appear counterfactual or marginal – if not nostalgic – from the sober van-
tage of knowing “the end of history”, in which the Ottoman Empire would 
neither survive the Great War nor make way for a multinational co-existence of 
Turks and Arabs. For contemporaries, however, the different models of federal-
ism and multinationalism could still save the Ottoman Empire.
The Habsburg Empire was one of various models of federalism and multina-
tionalism proposed by many contemporaries to solve the Ottoman dilemma in 
tribution by Ü. Gülsüm Polat, Türk-Arap İlişkileri: Eski Eyaletler Yeni Komşulara Dönüşürken 
(1914-1923) (Istanbul: Kronik Kitap, 2019), which was published during the last revisions of this 
paper. I would like to thank Mustafa Aksakal, Remzi Çağatay Çakırlar, Talha Çiçek, Süreyya 
Emre, Ramazan Erhan Güllü, M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Murat Kaya, Hasan Kayalı, Maryam al-Kha-
sawneh, Jazaa Khodair, Ömer Koçyiğit, Nicholas Kontovas, Soumaya Louhichi-Güzel, Leyla 
von Mende, Ramazan H. Öztan, Alp Eren Topal, Kerem Uygun, and Florian Zemmin for help-
ing me in various ways. Unless cited otherwise, I am responsible for all translations. In addition 
to the three anonymous reviewers, editor Rainer Brunner provided a detailed review that 
made the final manuscript decisively better. Despite all the help, I am alone responsible for 
the remaining errors and misjudgments.
2 Muḥammad Kurd ʿAlī, al-Mudhakkirāt (Damascus: Maṭbaʿat al-Taraqqī, 1948-51), I, 145. See 
also Ali Bilgenoğlu, Osmanlı Devleti’nde Arap Milliyetçi Cemiyetleri (Antalya: Yeniden Anadolu 
ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Yayınları, 2007), 89-90, note 259. 
3 The idea that the Habsburg Empire was “doomed to destruction” was not as popularized as 
the “sick man of Europe” cliché about the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, after the end of the 
Habsburg Empire, this teleology of collapse came to dominate the historiography of Austria-
Hungary. John Deak, “The Great War and the Forgotten Realm: The Habsburg Monarchy and 
the First World War”, The Journal of Modern History 86:2 (2014), 336-80. 
4 Reinhart Koselleck, “‘Erfahrungsraum’ und ‘Erwartungshorizont’ – zwei historische Kate-
gorien”, in Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1979), 349-75. 
Downloaded from Brill.com04/09/2020 02:54:54PM
via free access
 3Envisioning Turco-Arab Co-Existence between Empire and Nationalism
Die Welt Des Islams (2020) 1-41 | doi:10.1163/15700607-00600A17
dealing with the question of nationalism. For instance, the British journalist 
and expert on the Balkans George Frederick Abbott wrote in 1909 that the 
Young Turks’ “model, in dealing with these national problems, should not be 
France or Germany but Austria”.5 Although the simultaneous collapses of the 
Ottoman and Habsburg empires surely deserve further attention,6 in what fol-
lows, I will rather discuss how Ottoman opinion makers debated various sce-
narios of Turco-Arab co-existence described with reference to various 
federative and imperial models.7 The fact that some Turks and Arabs envi-
sioned co-existence complicates the historiographical narratives at the nexus 
of empire and nationalism.8
The existing historiography has indeed taken note of such contemporary 
references to the Austro-Hungarian model or to other federal or fraternal ideas 
of Turco-Arab co-existence. However, as Feroz Ahmad recently concluded, this 
debate over a Turco-Arab “dual monarchy has not been taken seriously by 
modern scholars”.9 The fact that the most dedicated (and largely idealized) 
study on Ottoman-Arab federalism is a book by Hassan Saab, written at a time 
when the United Arab Republic was still featured on world maps, reveals the 
5 George F. Abbott, Turkey in Transition (London: Edward Arnold, 1909), 99-100. 
6 For such comparative studies, see Karen Barkey, “Changing Modalities of Empire: A Com-
parative Study of Ottoman Decline and Habsburg Decline”, in Empire to Nation: Historical 
Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World, ed. Joseph Esherick, Hasan Kayalı and Eric 
van Young (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 167-97; Fikret Adanır, “Religious 
Communities and Ethnic Groups under Imperial Sway: Ottoman and Habsburg Lands in 
Comparison”, in The Historical Practice of Diversity: Transcultural Interactions from the Early 
Modern Mediterranean to the Postcolonial World, ed. Dirk Hoerder, Christiane Harzig and 
Adrian Shubert (New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2003), 54-86. 
7 How Ottomans (and Egyptians) imagined the Habsburg dual monarchy is discussed in 
Mestyan, “Austria-Hungary in Ottoman Arabic Political Thought”. For a general overview of 
federalism in the Ottoman Empire, see Elektra Kostopoulou, “Autonomy and Federation 
within the Ottoman Empire: Introduction to the Special Issue”, Journal of Balkan and Near 
Eastern Studies 18:6 (2016), 525-32. See also the forthcoming conference volume: Olof Heilo 
and Johanna Chovanec, eds., Viribus Unitis: Myths and Narratives of Habsburg and Ottoman 
Multinationalism 1848-1918. URL: <https://www.academia.edu/37780651/Viribus_Unitis_
Myths_and_Narratives_of_Habsburg_and_Ottoman_Multinationalism_1848_1918_confer 
ence_programme_and_abstracts> (accessed 30 November 2019).
8 For some of the challenges of such an approach, see Alexander Semyonov, “The Ambiguity of 
Federalism as a Postimperial Political Vision”, Ab Imperio 3 (2018), 23-30. How studying “ecu-
menical” co-existence in the Middle East deconstructs the sectarianism paradigm is discussed 
in Ussama S. Makdisi, Age of Coexistence: The Ecumenical Frame and the Making of the Modern 
Arab World (Oakland: University of California Press, 2019), 3-6.
9 Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks and the Ottoman Nationalities: Armenians, Greeks, Albanians, 
Jews, and Arabs, 1908-1918 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2014), 118-19. 
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sociology of historiography.10 The commonplace verdict of historiography so 
far has been to point out the marginality and triviality of Turco-Arab federal-
ism in face of the inevitable collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the unstop-
pable emergence of Turkish and Arab nationalisms in a mutually antagonizing 
fashion. Many historians made references to Arab proposals to adopt the 
 Austro-Hungarian model, but only to showcase the retrospectively surprising 
loyalty of many self-proclaimed Arab nationalists to the Ottoman Empire – 
 either because of their devout commitment to Islamic unity or due to their 
deficient national consciousness. Others appreciated the nostalgia of such 
missed opportunities, which could have potentially made liberal and cosmo-
politan futures possible.11 My assertion is that we can make sense of visions of 
Turco-Arab co-existence in the Ottoman Empire only if we establish a critical-
historiographical approach that avoids teleological bias and methodological 
nationalism which see the foreshadowing of future nation-states in every 
 accident of history.
Processes of transformation from multinational empires to nation-states – 
including the historical case of the Ottoman Empire – have attracted consider-
able scholarly attention in the last few decades. Yet, most studies confirm the 
conventional conceptual dichotomy between empires and nation-states. Fur-
thermore, they do not break with the cause-or-consequence dilemma between 
empire and nationalism.12 Recent studies in the historical sociology and com-
parative history of empires illustrate commonalities between empires and na-
10 Hassan Saab, The Arab Federalists of the Ottoman Empire (Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1958). 
Saab’s book consists of a compilation of the literature based on an idealized understanding 
of a distinct Arab culture of federalism since the dawn of history that had its missed mo-
ment in the early twentieth century. According to a harsh review of the book by Bernard 
Lewis, it was “an example of how one modern writer views and presents the past”, in 
BSOAS 23:1 (1960), 147-48. For the popularity of the topic of Arab federalism in the late 
1950s, see also Abdul Khuzayim, “Trends toward Federalism among the Arab Peoples” 
(MA thesis, University of Southern California, 1958). In Turkey, the history of Turco-Arab 
federalism received some popular attention only after Turkey’s military interventions into 
Syria. See, for example, Doğu Perinçek, “Atatürk’ün Suriye ve Irak ile Konfederasyon/
Federasyon Girişimi”, Aydınlık, 25 August 2019. URL: <https://www.aydinlik.com.tr/ata 
turk-un-suriye-ve-irak-ile-konfederasyon/federasyon-girisimi-dogu-perincek-kose-
yazilari-agustos-2019> (accessed 2 February 2020).
11 Çağlar Keyder, “The Ottoman Empire”, in After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-
Building, the Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires, ed. Karen 
Barkey and Mark von Hagen (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 38.
12 These issues are discussed in Wesley Hiers and Andreas Wimmer, “Is Nationalism the 
Cause or Consequence of the End of Empire?”, in Nationalism and War, ed. John A. Hall 
and Siniša Malešević (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 212-54; Ellen 
Comisso, “Empires as Prisons of Nations versus Empires as Political Opportunity Struc-
tures: An Exploration of the Role of Nationalism in Imperial Dissolutions in Europe”, in 
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tion-states, as well as between imperialism and nationalism.13 Despite its 
lingering underestimation in the historiography, Ottomanism constituted a 
crucial feature of the social construction and political reality of the empire.14
The conventional historiography of Arabs in the Ottoman Empire tells the 
story of foreign occupation and the oppression of Arabs under the so-called 
“Turkish yoke”, which resulted in the national liberation (actually, colonial sep-
aration) of Arab countries from the Ottoman Empire.15 This story, despite im-
portant revisions and corrections by international scholars, has been the 
dominant popular imaginary of Arab history.16 At the same time, my painting 
of a more fraternal picture of Turco-Arab co-existence is not meant to imply 
that hostile feelings among Turks and Arabs did not exist.17 On the contrary, 
Empire to Nation: Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World, ed. Joseph 
Esherick, Hasan Kayalı and Eric van Young (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 138-66.
13 Krishan Kumar, “Nation-States as Empires, Empires as Nation-States: Two Principles, One 
Practice?”, Theory and Society 39:2 (2010), 119-43; Stefan Berger and Alexei Miller, eds., 
Nationalizing Empires (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2015); Siniša Male-
šević, “Empires and Nation-States: Beyond the Dichotomy”, Thesis Eleven 139:1 (2017), 3-10.
14 On Ottoman-imperial nationalism, see Michelle U. Campos, “From the ‘Ottoman Nation’ 
to ‘Hyphenated Ottomans’: Reflections on the Multicultural Imperial Citizenship at the 
End of Empire”, Ab Imperio 1 (2017), 163-81; Benjamin C. Fortna, “The Ottoman Empire and 
After: From a State of ‘Nations’ to ‘Nation States’”, in State-Nationalisms in the Ottoman 
Empire, Greece and Turkey: Orthodox and Muslims, 1830-1945, ed. Benjamin C. Fortna et al. 
(London: Routledge, 2013), 1-12.
15 This narrative found its most popular formulation in the work of Lebanese author George 
Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement, Reprint (Beirut: 
Librairie du Liban, 1969). For the impact and persistence of Antonius’ narrative in the 
historiography, see William L. Cleveland, “The Arab Nationalism of George Antonius 
Reconsidered”, in Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East, ed. James P. Jankowski 
and Israel Gershoni (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 65-86. 
16 Rifaat A. Abou-el-Haj, “The Social Uses of the Past: Recent Arab Historiography of 
Ottoman Rule”, IJMES 14:2 (1982), 185-201. Moving beyond the denial and neglect of the 
Ottoman past, the study of Ottoman Arab lands is a growing research field: Albert H. 
Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1991); Hasan Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and 
Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); 
Jane Hathaway, The Arab Lands under Ottoman Rule, 1516-1800, trans. Karl K. Barbir (New 
York: Routledge, 2008); Eugene L. Rogan, The Arabs: A History (London: Allen Lane, 2009); 
Bruce A. Masters, The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516-1918: A Social and Cultural History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Frederick F. Anscombe, State, Faith, and 
Nation in Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Lands (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014).
17 M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, “The Young Turks and the Arabs before the Revolution of 1908”, in The 
Origins of Arab Nationalism, ed. Rashid Khalidi et al. (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1991), 31-49; Eliezer Tauber, “Turkish Dominance in the Eyes of the Arab Minority in 
the Late Ottoman Empire”, in Dominant Culture as a Foreign Culture: Dominant Groups in 
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there were indeed serious tensions between Turks and Arabs surrounding 
questions of sovereignty and solidarity. The defeats and the disintegration of 
the Ottoman Empire were the condition and context for such tensions. Given 
this, it is not surprising that there were visions of possible futures that very 
much contradicted ideals of a Turco-Arab co-existence. Some Turkish nation-
alists viewed the Habsburg Empire as a model only to justify the dominant role 
of Turks as the ruling nation of the empire.18 Some Ottoman Turks adopted 
what may even be described as Orientalist or colonialist attitudes towards the 
Arabs, whom they considered uncivilized.19 By the same token, many Arabs 
upheld Orientalist and racist ideas that antagonized the Turks as a barbaric 
race of despots in the tradition of the Mongols.20 An Islamic federative model 
proposed by Muslim reformer and Arab nationalist ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-
Kawākibī in his fictional pan-Islamic congress protocols, for instance, explic-
itly opposed the Ottoman Caliphate and antagonized Turks.21 After the end of 
the Ottoman Caliphate, the process of mutual antagonization between Turks 
and Arabs reached its zenith.22
More fraternal approaches to Turco-Arab co-existence saw promise in 
 federalism, multinationalism, and Muslim solidarity. Envisioning models of 
the Eyes of Minorities, ed. Janusz Mucha (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 
63-78.
18 See, for example, M.A., “Osmanlı İttihad”, Meşveret, no. 5 (1. February 1897): 1, cited in 
Hanioğlu, “The Young Turks and the Arabs before the Revolution of 1908”, 43.
19 On Ottoman Orientalism and colonialism see Christoph Herzog and Raoul Motika, 
“Orientalism ‘alla turca’: Late 19th / Early 20th Century Ottoman Voyages into the Muslim 
‘Outback’”, WI 40:2 (2000), 139-95; Ussama Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism”, The American 
Historical Review 107:3 (2002), 768-96; Selim Deringil, “‘They Live in a State of Nomadism 
and Savagery’: The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate”, Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 45:2 (2003), 311-42; Thomas Kühn, “Shaping and Reshaping 
Colonial Ottomanism: Contesting Boundaries of Difference and Integration in Ottoman 
Yemen, 1872-1919”, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 27:2 
(2007), 313-29. For a critique of postcolonial approaches to the Ottoman Empire see 
Vangelis Kechriotis, “Postcolonial Criticism Encounters Late Ottoman Studies”, Historein 
13 (2014), 39-46. 
20 Ulrich W. Haarmann, “Ideology and History, Identity and Alterity: The Arab Image of the 
Turk from the Abbasids to Modern Egypt”, IJMES 20:2 (1988), 175-96.
21 ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī, Umm al-Qurā (Cairo 1898), 154-55, cited in Wajda Sendesni, 
“The Young Turks and the Arabs in Egypt between Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism and Na-
tionalism”, in Penser, agir et vivre dans l’Empire ottoman et en Turquie: Études réunies pour 
François Georgeon, ed. Nathalie Clayer and Erdal Kaynar (Leuven: Peeters, 2013), 42. 
22 M. Talha Çiçek, “The Impact of the Sharif Hussein’s Revolt on the Nation-Building 
Processes of Turks and Arabs”, Journal of Academic Approaches 3:2 (2012), 98-111; Selim 
Deringil, The Ottoman Twilight in the Arab Lands: Turkish Memoirs and Testimonials of the 
Great War (Brighton, MA: Academic Studies Press, 2019), xiv–xv.
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Turco-Arab co-existence went beyond the liberal and cosmopolitan political 
currents of administrative decentralism (in Ottoman-Turkish: adem-i merkezi-
yet; in Arabic: lā-markaziyya). Such decentralist ideas were proposed against 
the “Young Turk” regime of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) that 
was championing centralization. Although sometimes based on ideas of de-
centralism, Turco-Arab co-existence was an expression mostly of Muslim-na-
tionalist sentiments and imperialist-conservative concerns about the future of 
the Ottoman Empire.23 This Ottoman-Muslim conservatism was, however, not 
related to notions of traditionalism or religiosity, as most of its adherents were 
progressive and secular nationalists.24 The conservative logic of a dual monar-
chy preserved the symbolic status of the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph and justified 
the legitimacy of the Ottoman state as the foremost Islamic empire in world 
politics, which would unite Turkism and Arabism under an imperial nation of 
Ottoman Muslims.
While the federalist ideas of Ottoman Arabs are far better known in the aca-
demic literature, in regards to Ottoman Turks, the commonplace interpreta-
tions follow the teleology of the Turkish nation-state formation. The Ottoman 
defeat in the First Balkan War in particular is considered a turning point of 
history, when the CUP decidedly tilted towards a radicalized version of Turkish 
ethnic-nationalism. As Ramazan H. Öztan recently cautioned in his historio-
graphical intervention, “Such a teleological approach has essentially homoge-
nized diverse Ottoman reactions to the Balkan defeat by reducing policy 
variations and disagreements to irrelevance.”25 Even an otherwise well-in-
formed scholar like Eyal Ginio defaults to the established formula that “the 
future desired connections between the Turks and Arabs [was] a topic that was 
marginal to the discussions in contemporary Turkish literature on the Balkan 
23 On the one hand, this notion of conservative nationalism connects to Hanioğlu’s assertion 
that the Young Turks during the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 were ideologically seen as 
“conservatives” because their primary motivation was to save the empire. M. Şükrü Ha-
nioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908 (Oxford: Oxford Uni versity 
Press, 2001), 190, 204. On the other hand, this approach relies on Zürcher’s concept-
ualization of Ottoman-Muslim nationalism as the policy-driving ideology of the Young 
Turk movement. Erik J. Zürcher, “Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists: 
Identity Politics, 1908-1938”, in Ottoman Past and Today’s Turkey, ed. Kemal H. Karpat 
(Leiden: Brill, 2000), 151-79. 
24 Cemil Aydin, “The Emergence of Transnational Muslim Thought, 1774-1914”, in Arabic 
Thought beyond the Liberal Age, ed. Jens Hanssen and Max Weiss (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), 140.
25 Ramazan H. Öztan, “Point of No Return? Prospects of Empire after the Ottoman Defeat in 
the Balkan Wars (1912-1913)”, IJMES 50:1 (2018), 65-84 (italics in original).
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Wars.”26 In order to correct this misperception, this article will illustrate Turk-
ish voices and visions of Turco-Arab co-existence. Envisioning co-existence 
was a major part of public debates surrounding the salvation of the empire. 
Such visions were especially popular in times of crisis and received vociferous 
support within conservative-nationalist circles.
In the following, this article will first showcase how a particular vision of a 
Turco-Arab state proposed by Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz travelled across 
time and space in the Ottoman realms. Second, by delving into the intense 
discussions among self-proclaimed Turkists about the nature of the Ottoman 
state after the defeats in the Balkans, it will be illustrated that many of them 
envisioned a Turco-Arab empire. Third, visions and voices of Turco-Arab soli-
darity will be traced within the contentious cacophony of wartime propagan-
da during the Arab Revolt of the First World War. Lastly, I will argue that a 
federalist moment took place in Turco-Arab relations during the post-war par-
tition of the Ottoman Empire. In doing so, this paper shall assert that the his-
tory of transitional periods must take into consideration the assumptions and 
imaginations of historical agents – even if these failed to correctly envision the 
future awaiting them.
 Colmar von der Goltz’s Vision of a Turco-Arab Empire
It is difficult to tell when the Ottoman Empire was first imagined as a Turco-
Arab state.27 Probably the first prominent person proposing such an idea 
was General Field Marshall Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, the long-term 
 German inspector at the Ottoman Military Academy and the so-called “father 
of the Turkish Army”.28 As early as 1897, “Goltz Pasha” proposed that the Otto-
man Empire could become a strong Turco-Arab empire instead of a weak Byz-
antium.29 He divided the Ottoman Empire into two spheres, a Turkish and an 
26 Eyal Ginio, “Making Sense of the Defeat in the Balkan Wars: Voices from the Arab Prov-
inces”, in War and Nationalism: The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913, and Their Sociopolitical 
Implications, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz and Isa Blumi (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 
2013), 609. 
27 For a more detailed investigation, especially in regards to ideas of duality of the Egyptian 
and the Ottoman empires in the late nineteenth century, see Mestyan, “Austria-Hungary 
in Ottoman Arabic Political Thought”. 
28 F.A.K. Yasamee, “Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz and the Rebirth of the Ottoman Empire”, 
Diplomacy and Statecraft 9:2 (1998), 91-128. See also Josef van Ess, “Ein Jubiläum zum Jahre 
2011: Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz”, in Kleine Schriften by Josef van Ess, ed. Hinrich 
Biesterfeldt (Leiden: Brill, 2018), III/2262-87.
29 Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, “Stärke und Schwäche des türkischen Reiches”, Deutsche 
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Arab one. There had been increasing animosity between Turks and Arabs, as 
he admitted. Yet, in his view, this animosity did not have deep cultural roots. 
He suggested that “the strong bond of common religion” would welcome an 
improvement in these relations. According to von der Goltz, “The question of 
the reconciliation of the Arab world with the Caliphate of the Ottoman Sultans 
was of greater importance for Turkey than a piece of Macedonia, Epirus or 
Thessaly.”30 He made an important proposal – that the capital should be relo-
cated to Konya or Kayseri in Central Anatolia, or even maybe as far south as 
Damascus, Mosul, or Baghdad.31 In the end, once the “Arab Question” was 
solved, as von der Goltz elaborated, the development of an “islamitischen Cul-
turstaat” was possible.32
Perhaps great minds think alike. Similar ideas were proposed by none other 
than Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, the most famous Islamic reformer and Arab 
intellectual of the time. Concerned about the future of the Ottoman Empire 
and the current state of the Muslim world, Riḍā proposed in 1898 to culturally 
Arabize the Turks in order to create a unified, monolingual Muslim nation in 
the Ottoman Empire.33 In an article from 1903, Riḍā repeated his idea to Ara-
bize the Turks, and he proposed to surrender Constantinople and the Balkan 
provinces to Russia to receive their help in bringing Egypt back into the Otto-
man state, which was reorganized after the federative model of the United 
States of America:
Then he [the Ottoman Caliph] has to make Damascus his capital and 
work to rebuild the Arab provinces that his predecessors have neglected 
or destroyed. Afterwards, he will make Arabic the official language of the 
state, will seek to Arabize all Turks, establish with them and Arabs of Iraq, 
Hijaz and Nedjd a regular army and apply shariʿa law. If he does this, he 
will have a great kingdom with sure security, and he will have no fear of 
separatists who use the caliphate.34
Rundschau 24:93 (1897), 95-119. This article was translated and published in Ottoman-
Turkish translation by Zaimzade Hasan Fehmi as a booklet in 1906 in Cairo under the title 
Devleti ‘Aliyenin Za’f ve Kuvveti.
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 116. 
32 Ibid., 118.
33 This idea was proposed by Riḍā as a counter-model to the multilingual Austro-Hungarian 
Empire. Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, “al-Iṣlāḥ al-dīnī”, pt. 1, al-Manār 1 (1898), 769-71, cited in 
Mahmoud Haddad, “Arab Religious Nationalism in the Colonial Era: Rereading Rashīd 
Riḍā’s Ideas on the Caliphate”, JAOS 117:2 (1997), 253-77.
34 Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, “al-Dawla al-ʿālīyya wa-Maqidūnyā wa-ra⁠ʾy fi l-iṣlāḥ”, al-Manār, 
24. August 1903, quoted in Sendesni, “The Young Turks and the Arabs in Egypt between 
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Meanwhile, Goltz Pasha himself repeated his own proposal on several occa-
sions, probably most often to his favourite student, Pertev (Demirhan) Pasha of 
the Ottoman Army. In September 1906, he wrote to Pertev:
There [in Arabia] lies still a vast territory, which could be pulled back for 
the strengthening of Turkey. Once it is realized bringing all of Arabia 
more or less under the supremacy of His Majesty, the Sultan, only then, 
the losses the Empire experienced in the North at the European front in 
the last decades, will be replaced completely. It was only in the course of 
recent history that territorial shifts occurred, which will rather end up 
[working] for the benefit of Turkey.35
When Pertev was appointed to Baghdad in early 1907, Colmar von der Goltz 
saw a great opportunity. In his letter to Pertev, he wrote that Pertev should “be-
come acquainted with the Islamic-Arabic world more thoroughly”, because 
once “the Turkish government succeeds in reconciling the whole Arab element 
with His Authority and incorporating it, it would also be possible to a certain 
degree to reinstate the former Turkish power.” He continued the letter by re-
peating his idea that “the right capital for the Turkish Empire would be Damas-
cus, where the Sovereign of both worlds which constitute the empire, namely 
that of the Turks and the Arabs, could unite them in a close relationship.”36 In 
another letter dated 1907, Goltz Pasha urged Pertev on the importance of main-
taining Turkish rule over the Arabs, because “the future of Turkey depends 
mostly on how the rule of the Sultan aligns itself with the Arab world. It must 
be first subordinated and then reconciled.”37
The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 changed the prospect of living together 
within a multi-ethnic empire under a constitutional monarchy. Like many Ot-
tomans, Arabs celebrated the return to the constitutional system.38 Just as Ar-
Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism and Nationalism”, 43-44. On Riḍā’s approach to Turkish 
language in this period, see Rainer Brunner, “Lātinīya lā-dīnīya: Muḥammad Rašīd Riḍā 
über Arabisch und Türkisch im Zeitalter des Nationalismus”, in Osmanische Welten: Quel-
len und Fallstudien: Festschrift für Michael Ursinus, ed. Johannes Zimmermann, Christoph 
Herzog and Raoul Motika (Bamberg: University of Bamberg press, 2016), 82-88.
35 von der Goltz, letter to Pertev, September 1906, quoted in Pertev Demirhan, Generalfeld-
marschall Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz: Das Lebensbild eines grossen Soldaten. Aus meinen 
persönlichen Erinnerungen (Göttingen: Göttinger Verlagsanstalt, 1960), 98-99. 
36 von der Goltz, letter to Pertev, 10 January 1907, quoted in ibid., 101-02. 
37 von der Goltz, letter to Pertev, 2 September 1907, NL (Nachlass) Goltz 10, Bundesarchiv 
Militärarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau. 
38 Although the Arab reactions to the Young Turk Revolution were framed with greater 
scepticism in Elie Kedourie, “The Impact of the Young Turk Revolution on the Arabic- 
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abs were members and supporters of the CUP, many Turks joined Arab 
organizations.39 The enthusiasm of the revolution was, however, soon crushed 
after a series of international events. First, on October 5, 1908, Bulgaria de-
clared its independence from the Ottoman Empire. Second, only one day later, 
on October 6, the Austro-Hungarian Empire unilaterally annexed Bosnia-Her-
zegovina, which had been under Habsburg administration since the Berlin 
Congress of 1878. One day after the Bosnian crisis, and two days after Bulgarian 
independence, Goltz Pasha wrote a letter to his protégé Pertev, once again 
pointing out that the future of the empire lay in strengthening its position in 
the Arab provinces. After adding that Bulgaria’s declaration of independence 
should be regarded as a relief to the Ottoman Empire, he wrote:
The future Turkey will, I hope, in general assume a quite different form 
from that to date and occupy itself more with its Asiatic interests than 
with the petty European Balkan questions, which are of subordinate sig-
nificance for the Empire’s existence. All labour and effort should now be 
devoted to the strengthening of army and fleet. If these two progress ob-
servably, then Turkey’s prestige will also rise, regardless of the coronation 
in Tirnowo and the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Once Turkey 
is strong enough to demand Egypt back, and to bring Arabia entirely un-
der its sceptre, then all the losses of recent times will be more than made 
up for.40
Goltz Pasha’s appreciation for the idea of a Turco-Arab empire was based on 
his cultural pessimism about the decay of European civilization. In turn, he 
cultivated a fondness for the conservative notions of authority, masculinity, 
Speaking Provinces of the Ottoman Empire”, in Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies, 
ed. Elie Kedourie (London: Frank Cass, 1974), 124-61, recent scholarship illustrates genuine 
local initiatives in celebrating the revolution, especially in cosmopolitan-urban centres of 
the eastern Mediterranean: Bedross D. Matossian, Shattered Dreams of Revolution: From 
Liberty to Violence in the late Ottoman Empire (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), 
23-48; Michelle U. Campos, Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early 
Twent ieth-Century Palestine (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 26-34; Ilham 
Khuri-Makdisi, The Eastern Mediterranean and the Making of Global Radicalism, 1860-1914 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 82-83.
39 Michael Provence, The Last Ottoman Generation and the Making of the Modern Middle 
East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 45.
40 von der Goltz, letter to Pertev, 7 October 1908, NL Goltz 10. Partly quoted also in Yasamee, 
“Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz and the Rebirth of the Ottoman Empire”, 110-11. See also 
De mirhan, Generalfeldmarschall Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, 120. 
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and martialism of Muslim cultures.41 His perspective was surely eccentric and 
marginal within the Orientalist mainstream in Europe. Most Orientalists imag-
ined that Arabs and Turks were set apart by their racial differences. Following 
the scriptural teachings of Islam, some Orientalists even supported the idea 
that Arabs should not accept a non-Arab as their Caliph.42 Nevertheless, von 
der Goltz was no less an Orientalist in his assumptions. According to him, the 
Ottoman Empire had no business in Europe, because it was an Asiatic empire. 
It should stop trying to become a European nation. Even the Ottoman capital, 
Constantinople, was not Asian enough, but rather decadent in the Byzantine 
sense. Hence, he advised Turks to finally come to terms with their Oriental and 
Islamic descent and unite with their more conservative and authentic Arab 
co-religionists. This idea, proposed by Goltz Pasha on several occasions, did 
not necessarily initiate a major public discussion in the Ottoman Empire, but, 
as I will illustrate later, it remained in the political imaginary of many.
 Turkism and Arabism United after 1913
In the aftermath of the constitutional revolution, ideas of federalism and re-
gional autonomy were in fact major themes of debate among the Ottoman 
public. Some Arabs even initially mistook the CUP as the harbinger of Otto-
man decentralism.43 In the course of the heated centralization-versus-decen-
tralization debates, the wide spectrum of the Young Turk coalition had long 
fallen into rival factions that were now established as oppositional parties. On 
the one hand, the liberal faction of the Young Turk movement was led by 
Prince Sabahaddin and formed the Liberal Entente (Ahrar Fırkası). The Liberal 
Entente upheld policies of liberal and cosmopolitan decentralism by support-
ing the administrative autonomy of provinces and liberalism in economic and 
social developments, as well as cooperation with international monitoring 
missions. On the other hand, the militant cadre of Young Turks had dominated 
the political party of the CUP since the revolution. The CUP supported ideas of 
administrative centralism, imperial state-building, and revolutionary patrio-
tism to safeguard the sovereignty of the Ottoman state. Prominent members of 
41 Yasamee, “Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz and the Rebirth of the Ottoman Empire”, 122. 
42 For Orientalist debates on returning the Caliphate to the Arabs, see Ş.T. Buzpinar, “Op-
posi tion to the Ottoman Caliphate in the Early Years of Abdülhamid II: 1877-1882”, WI 36:1 
(1996), 59-89. 
43 Salim Tamari, The Great War and the Remaking of Palestine (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 2017), 120; ʿAbd-al-ʿAziz Duri, The Historical Formation of the Arab Nation: 
A Study in Identity and Consciousness (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 267, note 55.
Downloaded from Brill.com04/09/2020 02:54:54PM
via free access
 13Envisioning Turco-Arab Co-Existence between Empire and Nationalism
Die Welt Des Islams (2020) 1-41 | doi:10.1163/15700607-00600A17
the CUP were, therefore, initially against the Austro-Hungarian and other fed-
eralist models. Instead, they advocated an assimilating imperial nationalism 
under the rule of the Muslim Turkish revolutionary elite.44 One prominent 
member the CUP, and one of its most chauvinist proponents, Dr Nazım, made 
clear that he vehemently rejected Prince Sabahaddin’s version of decentral-
ism:
Prince Sabahaddin is dead; he exists no more; his programme of decen-
tralization, of autonomous nationalities and provinces is abandoned. 
The Committee of Progress and Union wants centralization and a Turk-
ish monopoly on power. It wants no nationalities in Turkey. It does not 
want Turkey to become a new Austria[-Hungary]. It wants a unified Turk-
ish nation-state with Turkish schools, a Turkish administration, [and] a 
Turkish legal system.45
In 1911, Emrullah Efendi, the former minister of education and a CUP member, 
asked Prince Sabahaddin in a public letter, “Do you perhaps want to establish 
autonomous governments in Arabia, Macedonia, Albania within the Ottoman 
realm, imitating the government of Austria-Hungary […]?” He explained his 
objection against decentralism as follows:
If this decentralization you imagine, which you regard as the only cure 
for our homeland, is the decentralization that is prevalent in Switzerland 
and Austria-Hungary, our homeland is not resilient enough to adopt a 
decentralization that makes way for political discord in place of unity of 
legislation.46
Many CUP members coming from the Macedonian guerrilla cadre of the 
Young Turk movement were obsessed with the dangerous entrapments of the 
44 Howard Eissenstat, “Modernization, Imperial Nationalism, and the Ethnicization of 
Confessional Identity in the Late Ottoman Empire”, in Nationalizing Empires, ed. Stefan 
Berger and Alexei Miller (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2015), 455-59; 
Ramazan H. Öztan, “Nationalism in Function: ‘Rebellions’ in the Ottoman Empire and 
Narratives in its Absence”, in War and Collapse: World War I and the Ottoman State, ed. 
M. Hakan Yavuz and Feroz Ahmad (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2016), 161-202.
45 Nordau to Wolffsohn, Paris, 25 November 1908, Central Zionist Archives Jerusalem, 
W 96/I, quoted in Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution, 260.
46 Emrullah, ‘İdare-i Vilâyat I,’ Yeni Muhit’ül Maarif Gazetesi, no. 1 (14 Nisan 1327 [27 April 
1911]): 6-13, quoted in Şehbal Derya Acar, “Bir Meşrutiyet Aydını Emrullah Efendi’nin 
Gözüyle Türk Kamu Yönetiminde Merkeziyet, Adem-i Merkeziyet ve Tevsî-i Mezuniyetin 
Genel Görünümü”, Yakın Dönem Türkiye Araştırmaları 7:13/14 (2008), 107-28.
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geopolitics of the Eastern Question in such struggles for regional or communal 
autonomy.47 They distrusted any decentralist attempt for autonomy as a step 
towards imperial disintegration.48 Nevertheless, the CUP made investments 
into the Arab lands in order to spread its associate clubs and to propagate the 
benefits of the revolution.49 For instance, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) was one of 
the CUP members sent to Libya after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, where 
he reorganized the existing clubs of exiled Young Turks by including Arabs 
among their ranks.50 The Italian occupation of Ottoman Libya in 1911 gave the 
CUP a chance to demonstrate its commitment to the integrity of the Ottoman 
Empire against foreign aggression. Indeed, many famous Young Turk activist 
officers volunteered to conduct guerrilla warfare alongside Libyan tribal war-
riors.51 The Libyan experience had a tremendous impact on the Young Turks’ 
understanding of the prospects and limits of Ottoman-Muslim anti-colonial-
ism.52 As Benjamin Fortna put it, “The engagement in Libya symbolized the 
vision of defending the beleaguered Ottoman Empire by drawing on Muslim 
‘national’ unity – in other words, Muslim nationalism.”53
Under the new Freedom and Accord Party (Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası), all sup-
porters of liberal and cosmopolitan decentralism united and created a serious 
opposition against the CUP. Decentralism was one of the major debate points 
in the electoral competition. Nonetheless, Hasan Kayalı contends that support 
for local deputies was based on personal or tribal relations and not due to ide-
ological party preferences: “The decentralization-centralization debate had 
only a weak ideological content.”54 The 1912 elections could perhaps have 
47 Erik J. Zürcher, “The Young Turks: Children of the Borderlands?”, International Journal of 
Turkish Studies 9:1-2 (2003), 275-86.
48 Murat Kaya, “Western Interventions and Formation of the Young Turks’ Siege Mentality”, 
Middle East Critique 23:2 (2014), 127-45.
49 Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks, 60-64.
50 Rachel Simon, “Mustafa Kemal in Libya”, in Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey, ed. 
Jacob M. Landau (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 20-21.
51 For example, Enver realized that it did not matter to Arabs in Benghazi that he was the 
“hero of freedom” of the Young Turk Revolution or a major in the Ottoman Army’s General 
Staff; he was respected only because he was the son-in-law of the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph. 
Like many fellow Ottoman officers dispatched to the Italian-Ottoman war, Enver spoke 
very highly about the bravery of the Libyan warriors and peasants. Diary entry, 16 No vem-
ber 1911, in Enver Pasha, Um Tripolis, ed. Friedrich Perzyński (München: Bruckmann, 
1918), 22.
52 Jonathan C. McCollum, “The Anti-Colonial Empire: Ottoman Mobilization and Resistance 
in the Italo-Turkish War” (PhD thesis, University of California Los Angeles, 2018).
53 Benjamin C. Fortna, The Circassian: A Life of Eşref Bey, Late Ottoman Insurgent and Special 
Agent (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 81.
54 Hasan Kayalı, “Elections and the Electoral Process in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1919”, 
IJMES 27:3 (1995), 265-86.
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brought the Liberals into a majority, if the elections had not been rigged by the 
CUP’s intrigues and intimidations.55 The Italian naval attacks against Beirut 
and the CUP’s war propaganda, which generated feelings of Ottoman and Is-
lamic solidarity, were certainly influential in confusing the Arab public’s per-
ceptions of the CUP.56
The war against Italy was interrupted by the outbreak of the First Balkan 
War in 1912, which ended in a devastating defeat for the Ottoman Empire. The 
CUP took over the government after a violent coup d’état and could only recap-
ture symbolic and neighbouring territories in Thrace during the Second Balkan 
War in 1913. Practically, Ottoman Europe was all but lost. History had now prov-
en Goltz Pasha’s pessimism right. The Balkans had indeed become a lost cause, 
and the empire was geographically more Asiatic and demographically more 
Muslim. In an article in the Austrian newspaper Neue Freie Presse, Colmar von 
der Goltz wrote:
[With the construction of the Baghdad Railway] the Turkish half of the 
Empire will be related to the Arab half, both will be brought into a closer 
connection and exchange with each other. Since the loss of the Balkan 
provinces, this is the most important matter – an existential matter of the 
first-order – for the empire.57
Again, he urged the necessity of relocating the Ottoman capital to the Fertile 
Crescent. He admitted that the Ottoman elites “would resist [the idea of] leav-
ing ‘paradise on earth’ [Istanbul] and resettling in Aleppo or Damascus.” He 
added: “The great statesman who would accomplish this would earn himself a 
timeless achievement for the Empire.” Regarding fears of a re-emergence of an 
Arab caliphate, von der Goltz reassured that:
The fear that the Caliphate, which has been under the House of the Otto-
man Sultans since the times of Selim I, could become Arab because of 
this replacement is ill-founded. This threat is greater the more north the 
Caliph stays, and the more the gleam of his power pales away after unfor-
tunate wars.58
55 Rashid I. Khalidi, “The 1912 Election Campaign in the Cities of Bilad Al- Sham”, IJMES 16:4 
(1984), 461-74.
56 McCollum, “The Anti-Colonial Empire”, 36-37.
57 Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, “Die Türkei nach dem Frieden”, Neue Freie Presse, 18 May 
1913, 2.
58 Ibid. 
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After the devastating Balkan defeats, at least two books by Colmar von der 
Goltz were published in Ottoman-Turkish, which were translated collections 
of his German articles on the matter.59 It is remarkable that Ottomans discuss-
ing this idea of a Turco-Arab empire were directly referred to Goltz Pasha. Ger-
man ambassador Hans Freiherr von Wangenheim reported on May 29, 1913, 
that his articles attracted so much attention that the government soon prohib-
ited any public discussion about the relocation of the capital. According to 
Wangenheim, the grand vizier, Mahmud Şevket Pasha – another apprentice of 
Goltz Pasha and an Ottoman Iraqi – was a champion of this idea of a Turco-
Arab rapprochement. However, his vision took the form not of a change of the 
capital but instead of the founding of a second imperial residence in Aleppo in 
order to reconnect with the Arabs.60 After the assassination of Mahmud Şevket 
Pasha, this idea of relocating the capital was dropped.61 Ottoman-Turkish nov-
elist Halide Edib (Adıvar) noted in her 1930 book that the idea “to come to an 
understanding with the Arabs and create a dual monarchy with separate Par-
liaments and the Sultan Caliph, on the model of Austria and Hungary” had 
been one of the popular political ideas of that time. She remembered the pop-
ular impact of von der Goltz’s suggestion to relocate the capital to Aleppo.62 
Elsewhere, Halide Edib blamed the CUP leadership for not seizing that special 
moment:
When they came to power the thing that leaped to the eye was that the 
reduced Empire could not last. It could be strong enough to resist the 
overwhelming forces arrayed against it only through a close understand-
ing between the Turks and the Arabs. It is true that the Arabs were al-
ready seized with the nationalist fever, but there was an idea ascribed to 
Mahmoud Shevket Pasha, himself of Arab origin, which was worth a trial. 
It was the creation of a dual monarchy, Arabo-Turkish, with the seat of 
government at Aleppo. Whether it could have prevented Moslem disinte-
gration or not, one cannot be certain, but the experiment should have 
been made.63
59 Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, Osmanlılar Muharebeleri Nasıl Gaib Ettiler? Şimdi Nasıl 
Telafi ve Terakki Edebilirler?, ed. Adil Nami (Istanbul: Sancak Matbaası, 1331 [1913]); Colmar 
Freiherr von der Goltz, Genç Türkiye’nin Hezimeti ve İmkan-ı İtilası, ed. H. Cevdet (Istanbul, 
1332 [1914]).
60 Wangenheim to B. Hollweg (Therapia), 29 May 1913, Political Archive of the German 
Minister of Foreign Affairs (Auswärtiges Amt, Politisches Archiv, AA PA), R 13193.
61 Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks, 136-37. 
62 Halide Edib [Adıvar], Turkey Faces West: A Turkish View of Recent Changes and their Origin 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), 124. 
63 Halide Edib [Adıvar], Conflict of East and West in Turkey (Lahore: S.M. Ashraf, 1935), 81-82. 
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The traumatizing and infuriating Balkan defeat had a great impact on public 
debates in the Ottoman Empire.64 While conventional historiographical ac-
counts continue to stress a conscious turn towards Turkish nationalism after 
1913, there is contrary evidence that a more heterogeneous debate took place.65 
Immediately after the Balkan defeat, there were attempts by leading figures of 
the CUP to redefine the Ottoman Empire as a Turco-Arab state, even consider-
ing policies of decentralism.66 In an interview given to the newspaper Russka-
ya Molva from St Petersburg, the official CUP publicist Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), 
normally known for his centralist views, urged decentralization in the Arab 
provinces. Hüseyin Cahit elaborated the CUP polices after the Balkan Wars as 
follows:
[The Committee of] Union and Progress did not support decentralism in 
the past in order to avoid helping the plans of those demanding decen-
tralism only with the intention of separatism. After the war we were sep-
arated from those untrustworthy elements. The original elements of the 
Turkish state, Arabs and Armenians, can be dealt with in their favour. The 
interests of Turks and Armenians are not contradictory. Among the Arabs 
the development of a nationalist movement is apparent. As long as the 
Turks do not follow a too narrow policy, the excessive bond of Arabs to-
wards their religion would hinder them from departing from the Turks 
and endangering their religion. With reasonable and fair concessions, the 
Turks can easily connect with the Arabs. The union of the two Muslim 
peoples, which constitute the majority of the Ottoman state, would also 
guarantee the protection of the rights of the Christians: Since the Chris-
tian minorities would not cause damage to parliamentary procedures, 
nothing can prevent the accomplishment of their desires. The time has 
come for the ushering of an era of order and mutual agreement. There-
fore, the Young Turks need to embrace other elements in friendly terms 
and should quickly implement their political desires.67
64 For a comprehensive study of the Balkan trauma in the Ottoman Empire, see Eyal Ginio, 
Ottoman Culture of Defeat: The Balkan Wars and their Aftermath (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015). 
65 For critical interventions in the last years against this dominant paradigm in the 
historiography, see Öztan, “Point of No Return”; Ebru Boyar, “The Impact of the Balkan 
Wars on Ottoman History Writing: Searching for a Soul”, Middle East Critique 23:2 (2014), 
147-56. 
66 Following the teleological reasoning, for example, Bozarslan argues that there was a 
“Turkist turn” at this period after Balkan defeat – if not even earlier – that contributed to 
the rise of Arabism. Hamit Bozarslan, “The Ottomanism of the Non-Turkish Groups: The 
Arabs and the Kurds after 1908”, WI 56:3-4 (2016), 317-35.
67 Hüseyin Cahit’s Russian interview in Russkaya Molva is translated and quoted in T.Y., 
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Within the CUP’s intellectual circles, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, a journalist 
from a noble Kurdish family in Iraq and a deputy of Baghdad, practically para-
phrased Goltz Pasha when he proposed in the newspaper Tanin that “the Ot-
tomans need to return to Asia, they need to become an Asian nation”. He 
described the Ottoman Empire’s lost territories in the Balkans “as a growing 
hindrance” which needed to be thrown away “like a ballast”. Only then could 
“the state vessel sail safely to shore”. Babanzade İsmail Hakkı’s solemn plea 
was: “Didn’t we come to Europe from Asia, in the first place? Consequently, it is 
necessary to go back there and to become Asians, as we could not become 
Europeans.”68
Similar ideas were expressed by no less than Ziya Gökalp himself, professor 
of sociology, a member of the Central Committee of the CUP, and the leading 
ideologue of Turkish nationalism. Gökalp’s approach to the idea of a Turco-
Arab state was, on the one hand, sociological in analyzing the relationship be-
tween the state (devlet) and the nation (millet or ümmet). According to Gökalp, 
millet was the linguistic nation and ümmet was the Muslim nation. On the 
other hand, his analysis was also based on “social realities” – namely, the his-
torical and demographical context that followed the Balkan Wars. He proposed 
the following conclusion:
When we look at social realities, we cannot fail to see that an Islamic üm-
met, an Ottoman state (devlet), Turkish or an Arab nation (millet) do ex-
ist. […] For example, the Ottoman state is a Muslim state – that is, it is 
formed of Muslim nations. Two great nations, the Turks and the Arabs, by 
their numbers as well as by their culture and learning, served as the bases 
of the Ottoman state in such a way that the Ottoman state might be called 
a Turco-Arab state.69
In contrast, a few pages later, Gökalp argued the necessity of purifying the 
Turkish language from Arabic and Persian elements or Turkifying the Qurʾan.70 
“Osmanlı Devleti’nin Dahili ve Harici Siyasetine Dair”, Türk Yurdu 3:8 (1329 [1913]), 248-52, 
here 248-49. 
68 Babanzâde İsmail Hakkı, “Asyaya Avdet Nazariye-i Acayibesi”, Tanin, 1 March 1914, quoted 
in Bünyamin Kocaoğlu, “Balkan Savaşlarının İttihat ve Terakki Politikalarına Etkisi”, 
History Studies 5 (2013), 251-66. 
69 Ziya Gökalp, “Millet ve Vatan”, Türk Yurdu 6:6 (1330 [1914]), 2179-82. Later also published in 
his collection: Ziya Gökalp, Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak (Istanbul: Yeni 
Mecmua, 1918), 49-53, here 52, quoted from the translation in Ziya Gökalp, Turkish 
Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays, ed. Niyazi Berkes (London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1959), 76-79. 
70 Gökalp, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization, 85. See also M. Brett Wilson, 
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The one claim does not necessarily preclude the other.71 A follower of Gökalp 
and a typical propagandist of pan-Turkism, Ömer Seyfeddin, came up with the 
same formula in 1914.72 “In Turkey, with regard to density and cohesion the 
majority is constituted by two nations: Turkish [and] Arab.”73 Seyfeddin fur-
ther elaborated his understanding of the Ottoman nation as follows:
There is no material or moral reason to differentiate between the Turkish 
element, which constitutes the primary majority, and the Arab element.
 The government of the “House of Osman” is an Islamic government. 
Like Turks, Arabs are Muslims and, therefore, there is no difference be-
tween them. The Turks and Arabs are entirely equal in the face of the 
government and the law. No one can argue otherwise. The national ideal 
of the Turks is advancing and strengthening themselves to save their 
blood brothers and finally to build the “union of Islam”, namely the “Is-
lamic international” in order to defend the Muslim nations against the 
Christian nations.74
Another disciple of Gökalp, and yet another prominent representative of Turk-
ish nationalism in the historiography, Fuat Köprülü, followed the same logic. 
The Ottoman Empire had to be based on the Muslim foundation of Turks and 
Arabs. The emergence of Turkism and Arabism was a challenge for the Otto-
man state, yet Köprülü argued that Turks and Arabs should stand “back to 
back” and support each other. Although an assimilationist “merger” of these 
two nations was out of the question, Köprülü noted that the “impossibility of 
fusion is not an obstacle in accomplishing the unity and alliance of these two 
elements.”75 To be sure, such Ottoman-Muslim nationalist overtures to Arabs 
Trans lating the Qurʾan in an Age of Nationalism: Print Culture and Modern Islam in Turkey 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 131, 148-150.
71 Historians rather tend to underline Gökalp’s Turkification policies because they neatly 
confirm teleological bias. See, for example, Muhammad Y. Muslih, Origins of Palestinian 
Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 60. Revisionist scholars of a 
new generation, however, deal with greater serenity in making sense of Gökalp’s complex 
understanding of Islam, state, and nation. Alp Eren Topal, “Against Influence: Ziya Gökalp 
in Context and Tradition”, Journal of Islamic Studies 28:3 (2017), 283-310.
72 On Ömer Sefyeddin see Umut Uzer, An Intellectual History of Turkish Nationalism: Between 
Turkish Ethnicity and Islamic Identity (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2016), 
25-26.
73 Ömer Seyfeddin, Millî Tecrübelerden Çıkarılmış Amelî Siyaset (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Hayriye 
ve Şürekası, 1330 [1914]), 9.
74 Ibid., 15-16. 
75 Köprülüzade Mehmet Fuat, “Türklük, İslamlık, Osmanılılık”, Türk Yurdu 4:9 (1329 [1913]), 
701, quoted in Masami Arai, Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 
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did not mean a departure from the same authors’ adherence to ideas of Turk-
ish nationalism, pan-Turkism, and administrative centralism.
Envisioning Turco-Arab co-existence was especially popular among the 
conservative-nationalist circles of Turkists. A case in point is a faction of for-
mer CUP members who founded the National Constitution Party (NCP; Milli 
Meşrutiyet Fırkası), which constituted the only openly Turkist party of the Sec-
ond Constitutional Period.76 Contrary to received wisdom, Turkism did not 
exclude adherence to Ottomanism and pan-Islamism, nor dismiss Arabism.77 
A party manifest of the NCP proclaimed that they intended to unite Turkism 
and Arabism within an Ottoman-Islamic federation:
In our opinion, internal affairs must be based on the principles of Turkism 
within Turkey reaching from İzmir to Bayezid, from the Black Sea to the 
Arab deserts. This national policy must be followed.
 Syria, al-Jazira [Iraq], and the Arab Peninsula could and must be ad-
ministrated entirely within the principles of decentralism. Why should 
Damascus, Baghdad, Mecca and Sinai not be the centre and source of life 
for the Arab national community?
 For this reason, the National Constitution Party recognizes the Turkish 
and Arab nations as the two strong and solid pillars of the Ottoman state.
 […] A reasonably powerful Turkish nationalist policy in Turkey; In Ara-
bia a nationalist decentralism, and an Ottoman Sultanate and Caliphate 
uniting these two nationalist forces. In a nutshell, this is the political 
agenda of the National Constitution [Party].78
An NCP member, Abdürrahman Cami (Baykurt), wrote a series of articles pub-
lished after the Balkan defeat in the party’s periodical, İfham.79 Cami, a former 
CUP deputy of Fezzan in Ottoman Libya, where he had lived for many years in 
exile, was relatively well-acquainted with Arabism. In his article, Cami referred 
directly to Goltz Pasha’s idea as an inspiration: “From now on, the centre of 
64 
76 Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler I: İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi 1908-1918, 2nd ed. 
(Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1984), 351. 
77 On this Turco-Arab “modus vivendi”, see Djemal Pasha, Memories of a Turkish Statesman: 
1913-1919 (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1922), 97.
78 İfham, 27 January 1913, quoted in T.Y., “Osmanlı Devleti’nin Dahili ve Harici Siyasetine 
Dair”, 249. 
79 Abdürrahman C. Baykurt, Osmanlılığın Atîsi: Düşmanları ve Dostları (Istanbul: İfham 
Matbaası, 1331 [1915]). This book was originally published in the periodical İfham in 1913. 
See also Mustafa Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the 
First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 33.
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gravity of the Ottoman Empire is there where Turkish and Arab strength is 
generated. This fact did not escape von der Goltz’s eyes even fifteen years ago.”80 
The Ottoman Empire was once again becoming an “Asiatic empire”, since it 
never succeeded in becoming a “European state”. Asia has always been “the 
original homeland, the source of its life power, the centre of its gravity.”81 Ac-
cording to Cami, the future prosperity of the Ottoman Empire as an Islamic-
Asiatic empire was in Asia. The idea to move the capital was also repeated by 
Cami:
The relocation of the administrative and military centre of the Ottoman 
state to the border region of the Turkish and Arab countries, somewhere, 
where the Anatolian, Syrian, Iraqi and future Kurdistani railroads will 
cross each other, will occur as a result of political and military necessi-
ties.82
Ahmet Ferit (Tek), the founding president of the NCP, also proposed his idea of 
a Turco-Arab empire. Moving the capital was an option, but rather within the 
Turkish sphere, such as Kayseri, since possible separatist tendencies among 
the Arabs could not be entirely ruled out. But according to Ahmed Ferit, the 
Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich was not the right model, but rather the “Austria-
Galicia-Bohemia-Carinthia [model] provided a more appropriate analogy 
[…].”83 Another prominent member of the NCP, and the yet another ideologue 
of Turkish nationalism, Yusuf Akçura, wrote in a review of the year 1913:
In fact, Turkish nationalists keenly desire that the Ottoman government 
accept the reasonable demands of the Arabs. It is one of the principle 
ideas of Turkish nationalists not to prevent the natural development of 
people which can constitute a nation without challenging the Ottoman 
unity. As we have said elsewhere, according to Turkish nationalists, Islam 
is a supranational [fevka’l-milel] religion of morality and divinity; the 
 development of nationalism in the Islamic world will result in Islamic 
internationalism’s [beynelmileliyet-i İslamiye] advent to power. Besides, 
Turkists consider religion as a historical element of the ideational com-
position of nationalism; they believe that as Muslim nations are matur-
ing, the religion of Islam can also be revived. It is due to this principal 
80 Baykurt, Osmanlılığın Atîsi, 12. 
81 Ibid., 6-7.
82 Ibid., 13.
83 The National Archives, Foreign Office Papers (hereafter FO) 195/2453, 2368, Lowther, 
report to FO, no. 475 (Pera), 26 May 1913, cited in Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks, 137. 
Downloaded from Brill.com04/09/2020 02:54:54PM
via free access
22 Yenen
doi:10.1163/15700607-00600A17 | Die Welt Des Islams (2020) 1-41
conviction that the circle of Turkism, which has never been political, has 
evolved into political reconciliation and engaged in a correspondence of 
reconciliation with the Arabic literary circles.84
This Arabist turn by self-proclaimed Turkists was, of course, contingent on cer-
tain contexts and audiences. On other occasions, Akçura could have, and in 
fact had, easily alienated Arab nationalists with his pan-Turkism.85 Neverthe-
less, among the self-proclaimed Turkists, who founded the NCP as a conserva-
tive-nationalist alternative to the CUP, a major item on the agenda was a 
reconciliation with Arab nationalists based on an understanding of Islam as a 
supranationalism that did not stand in the way of the development of Turkism 
or Arabism.86
While prominent Turkist authors were eager to discuss the sociology of the 
Ottoman state in order to accommodate Turco-Arab co-existence, the debates 
in the Arab sphere of the empire were not much different. “Many Arab authors 
perceived the defeat and the loss of the Balkan provinces”, as Eyal Ginio con-
cluded, “as an opportunity to reshape the Turco-Arab partnership on a more 
equal basis.”87 Goltz Pasha’s influence was also observable in the Arab debates 
on the Balkan Wars. The Arabic journal al-Muqtaṭaf referred to von der Goltz 
and stated that “it is currently incumbent [on the Turks] to reconcile with the 
Arab component, to come to agreement with it and to refrain from considering 
their sultanate as a European state, regarding it instead as simply an Asian 
state.”88 Another prominent voice said: “It is necessary to leave behind all this 
Westernization in order to establish an Asiatic, military, nationalist force of 
Arabs and Turks.” These words were not of Goltz Pasha – at least not directly 
– but again that of Rashīd Riḍā writing in his journal al-Manār in Cairo. “Only 
then”, Riḍā argued, “will the people of the community be ready to fight and go 
84 Yusuf Akçura, “Geçen Yıl: 1329 Senesinde Türk Dünyası”, Türk Yurdu 6: 3-5 (1330 [1914]): 
2098-2104, 2135-2141, 2166-2169, here 2168. 
85 For instance, in March 1917, Yusuf Akçura, as a Tatar emmigrant to the Ottoman Empire, 
was working for the political cause of Turkic people of Russia. At a lecture he gave in 
Berlin, one of the auditors, Egyptian nationalist Muḥammad Farīd, however, “was greatly 
astonished by the concern of the Turks for their brethren in the north [Turkic population 
of Russia] and by their lack of interest in the Arab question in Baghdad and the Peninsula. 
[…] This is an indication of the Turks’ lack of interest in Arab countries and their trust in 
their own remaining capabilities without the Arab countries being with them.” Quoted in 
Ralph M. Coury, The Making of an Egyptian Arab Nationalist: The Early Years of Azzam 
Pasha 1893-1936 (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998), 127-28. 
86 Ahmad, The Young Turks and the Ottoman Nationalities, 121. 
87 Ginio, “Making Sense of the Defeat in the Balkan Wars”, 612. 
88 “Mustaqbal al-bilād al-ʿuthmāniyya”, al-Muqtaṭaf, 1 June 1913, quoted in ibid., 608. 
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to war to defend the community”. Yet, the problem was, as Riḍā practically 
voiced von der Goltz’s verdict: “The Government was bewitched by the glory of 
Constantinople’s fame and position.”89
Arab nationalists had long championed a federal solution with Turks under 
the Ottoman Caliphate. These ideas were similarly intensified after the Balkan 
defeat. Accusations of “Turkification” remained the major Arabist slogan in an-
tagonizing and opposing the centralist policies of the CUP regime. Yet, there 
was no collective consensus among Arabists regarding a possible departure, 
either from Turks or from the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Party for Admin-
istrative Decentralization (OPAD; Ḥizb al-Lā-markaziyya al-Idāriyya al-‘Uth-
mānī) was founded in Cairo in 1912 to represent Arab interests against the 
Turkification-cum-centralization policies of the CUP.90 Even though the OPAD 
formally opted for the Swiss model in its constitution, its preservation of the 
status of the Ottoman Sultanate clearly resembled the role of the emperor 
(Kaiser) in the Austro-Hungarian model.91 At the First Arab Congress of op-
position parties, in Paris in June 1913, major voices “affirmed the complete loy-
alty of the Arabs to the Ottoman Empire and expressed the wish that Arabs 
and Turks might live together in equality and harmony within a united 
Empire.”92 The elected president of the congress, ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-Zahrāwī, 
said in his opening speech:
Upon reflecting on what has become of this “Turkish” government today, 
in which the Turks have applied the majoritarian principle in their favour 
over all other groups within this union, the Arabs realized a great duty, 
overlooked by both the Arabs and the Turks – the need to join the two 
groups in governing the country. For it has become obvious that the 
Arabs have not benefitted from their lack of intervention and the loss 
of [Balkan] territory, nor have the Turks benefitted from bearing, alone, 
the burden of that heavy loss. It is my firm belief that cooperation in gov-
ernment is not the reason for the disintegration of the brotherhood be-
tween Arabs and Turks; rather, the reason for the disintegration of the 
89 Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, “al-Dawla al-ʿuthmāniyya”, al-Manār, 6 February 1913. See also 
Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, “al-Ḥarb al-balqāniyya al-ṣalībiyya”, al-Manār, 8 January 1913, 
cited in ibid. 
90 On the OPAD, see Eliezer Tauber, The Emergence of the Arab Movements (London: Cass, 
1993), 121-34.
91 Eugene L. Rogan, The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East (New York: 
Basic Books, 2015), 24-25.
92 David S. Thomas, “The First Arab Congress and the Committee of Union and Progress, 
1913-1914”, in Essays on Islamic Civilization: Presented to Niyazi Berkes, ed. Donald P. Little 
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976), 319; Tauber, The Emergence of the Arab Movements, 178-97. 
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brotherhood between Arabs and Turks is the fact that there is no coop-
eration in government. We have therefore become proponents of the de-
centralist position, which we believe is the most efficient means to 
highlight the need for this unity outside the capital (i.e., in the provinces).93
In similar terms, yet explicitly against the possibility of foreign intervention in 
the Arab provinces, ʿAbd al-Ghanī al-ʿUraysī championed Turco-Arab solidari-
ty at the Arab Congress.94 While the Arab Congress carefully voiced solidarity 
with the Ottoman Empire and Turks in explicitly decentralist terms, other Ar-
abs, who were in favour of the CUP regime, criticized the Arab Congress for 
creating disunity within the Ottoman-Muslim nation.95 The fact that during 
the First World War both al-Zahrāwī and al-ʿUraysī were hanged by the CUP 
regime for allegations of Arab separatism should not disprove their fraternal 
ideas of Turco-Arab co-existence within the Ottoman Empire. Both Turkists 
and Arabists supported different models of a Turco-Arab empire after the de-
feat in the Balkan Wars. Despite distrusting the intentions of the Arab nation-
alists, the CUP regime made important concessions to the demands of Arabism 
in this period.96 Their rising nationalist sentiments by no means contradicted 
the viability of the Ottoman Empire, but instead called for its reimagination.
 The Cacophony of Solidarity and Sovereignty during the Great War
Following the Ottoman decision to enter the First World War, the viability of 
Turco-Arab co-existence became a major issue for all belligerent parties. Allied 
countries intended to incite Arab secessionism. Therefore, ideas of Turco-Arab 
solidarity became one of the major pillars of the Young Turk regime’s wartime 
policies. The Young Turk regime was deeply invested in major imperial state-
93 Quoted in R. al-ʿAẓm, al-Muʼtamar al-ʿarabi ̄al-awwal: al-munʿaqad fi ̄ l-qāʿa al-kubrā li-l-
jamʿiyya al-jughrāfiyya bi-shāriʿ San Jarman fi ̄Bāris̄ (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Būsfūr, 1913), 36-37. 
For an excellent rereading of al-Zahrāwī’s Ottomanist thought, see Nobuyoshi Fujinami, 
“‘Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Zahrāwī and His Thought Reconsidered: An Intellectual Portrait of the 
Arab Nationalist as an Ottoman Politician”, The Journal of Ottoman Studies 51 (2018), 239-
63.
94 On al-ʿUraysī’s thoughts on Turco-Arab unity, see Duri, The Historical Formation of the 
Arab Nation, 238-46.
95 Abdurrahman Atçıl, “Decentralization, Imperialism, and Ottoman Sovereignty in the 
Arab Lands before 1914: Shakīb Arslān’s Polemic against the Decentralization Party”, WI 
53:1 (2013), 26-49.
96 M. Talha Çiçek, War and State Formation in Syria: Cemal Pasha’s Governorate during World 
War I, 1914-17 (London: Routledge, 2014), 41.
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building projects in the Arab provinces. The CUP regime’s declaration of the 
“jihad” against the Ottoman Empire’s enemies increased Muslim-nationalist 
propaganda also in the home front.97 Despite all its efforts, however, accusa-
tions of “Turkification” continued to haunt the CUP’s reputation in the Arab 
provinces.98 What many Arabs considered Turkification was mostly the CUP’s 
policies of centralization, as well as their chauvinistic and partisan behaviour.99 
Precisely because “the empire had become largely a Turco-Arab state”, as Al-
bert Hourani noted, “any attempt to emphasize the paramountcy of the Turk-
ish element was bound to upset the balance between them [Turks] and the 
Arabs, and by reaction Arab nationalism gradually became explicit.”100 Instead 
of bringing an end, the crisis of the Great War only intensified the debates 
about Turco-Arab co-existence.
On May 6, 1916, Cemal Pasha, minister of the navy and wartime governor of 
Syria, ordered the execution of twenty Arab nationalist activists associated 
with the OPAD in Damascus and Beirut for charges of traitorous collaboration 
with the French authorities.101 This incident was a major catalyst for the mani-
festation of popular Arab sentiments against the CUP regime and in framing 
Cemal Pasha as the “blood shedder” (al-Saffāḥ).102 For the population of Great-
er Syria, the trauma of the so-called seferberlik (literally, “military mobiliza-
tion”), in reference to the combined effects of forced displacement of young 
men by means of recruitment to the Ottoman Army and the wartime famine in 
the Levant caused by the Allied naval blockade and Cemal Pasha’s maladmin-
istration, ultimately marked the collective memory of the war as a time of 
97 Erik Jan Zürcher, ed., Jihad and Islam in World War I: Studies on the Ottoman Jihad at the 
Centenary of Snouck Hurgronje’s “Holy War Made in Germany” (Leiden: Leiden University 
Press, 2015).
98 Turkification allegations remain, regardless of revisions, one of the main pillars of modern 
Arab history in explaining the rise of Arab nationalism. Zeine N. Zeine, The Emergence of 
Arab Nationalism: With a Background Study of Arab-Turkish Relations in the Near East, 
Revised and reset ed. (Beirut: Khayats, 1966), 83; Hisham Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals and 
the West: The Formative Years; 1875-1914 (Baltimore: Hopkins, 1970), 107; Rashid Khalidi, 
“Ottomanism and Arabism in Syria Before 1914: A Reassessment”, in The Origins of Arab 
Nationalism, ed. Rashid Khalidi et al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 53-54; 
Mahmoud Haddad, “The Rise of Arab Nationalism Reconsidered”, IJMES 26 (1994), 201-22. 
99 Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks, 82-96, 208-211; C.E. Dawn, “The Origins of Arab National-
ism”, in The Origins of Arab Nationalism, ed. Rashid Khalidi et al. (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1991), 11-12.
100 Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, 307.
101 Eliezer Tauber, The Arab Movements in World War I (London: Cass, 1993), 45-56; Çiçek, War 
and State Formation in Syria, 47-56.
102 Leila Tarazi Fawaz, A Land of Aching Hearts: The Middle East in the Great War (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014), 233-274.
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 suf fering and oppression.103 The transgressive behaviour of Turkish officials 
continued to alienate the local population of the Levant – including the Mus-
lim Arabs.104 The influx of the Armenian refugees who had survived death 
marches and massacres coupled the brutal reality of demographic violence in 
near-by provinces in Anatolia with the Turkification-centralization debates in 
Syria.105 Moreover, Turkification accusations were closely linked with the pop-
ular assumption that the Young Turks were following a pan-Turkist agenda that 
neglected the Arab provinces.106 Despite its clear expression in Arab collective 
memories as a “point of no return”, it remains, however, doubtful whether Ce-
mal Pasha’s policies in Syria during the Great War directly triggered the Arab 
Revolt of 1916.107
The Arab Revolt of Sharif Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī al-Hāshimī of Mecca was mostly 
initiated, financed, and magnified by British military intelligence and never 
constituted a national-revolutionary movement in the core Arab provinces.108 
Sharif Ḥusayn’s political aims remained ambiguous throughout the war and 
103 Najwa al-Qattam, “Safarbarlik: Ottoman Syria and the Great War”, in From the Syrian Land 
to the States of Syria and Lebanon, ed. Thomas Philipp and Christoph Schumann (Würz-
burg: Ergon, 2004); Linda Schatkowski Schilcher, “The Famine of 1915-1918 in Greater 
Syria”, in Problems of the Modern Middle East in Historical Perspective: Essays in Honour of 
Albert Hourani, ed. John P. Spagnolo (Oxford: Ithaca Press, 1992), 229-58. 
104 Abigail Jacobson, “Negotiating Ottomanism in Times of War”, IJMES 40:1 (2008), 69-88.
105 Melanie S. Tanielian, The Charity of War: Famine, Humanitarian Aid, and World War I in the 
Middle East. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017), 243. There was in fact Turkification 
as a historical trajectory, but such policies differed depending on context – which is 
especially evident when one compares the CUP’s policies towards Armenians to those 
towards Arabs. Öztan, “Nationalism in Function”, 185-86; Erol Ülker, “Contextualising ‘Tur-
ki fi cation’: Nation-Building in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1908-18”, Nations and Na tional-
ism 11:4 (2005), 613-36.
106 When the Young Turk regime pulled resources from the Arab front in support of the Cau-
casus campaign in 1918, for instance, German military advisers blamed the Young Turks 
for following pan-Turkist policies. See, for example, Otto von Liman Sanders, Five Years in 
Turkey (Annapolis: The United States Naval Institution, 1927), 268-70. It is, however, 
doubtful whether the Caucasus campaign was motivated by pan-Turkism. Michael A. 
Reynolds, “Buffers, not Brethren: Young Turk Military Policy in the First World War and 
the Myth of Panturanism”, Past & Present 203:1 (2009), 137-79.
107 Mumtaz Ayoub Fargo, “Arab-Turkish Relations from the Emergence of Arab Nationalism 
to the Arab Revolt, 1848-1916” (PhD thesis, University of Utah, 1969), 239; Fawaz, A Land of 
Aching Hearts, 248.
108 Polly A. Mohs, British Intelligence and the Arab Revolt: The First Modern Intelligence War 
(London: Routledge, 2007). The harshest dismissal of the Arab Revolt is formulated in 
Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, “Myth in the Desert, or Not the Great Arab Revolt”, MES 32:2 
(1997), 267-312. For more comprehensive histories of the Arab Revolt, see Rogan, The Fall 
of the Ottomans, 275-309; Joshua Teitelbaum, The Rise and Fall of the Hashemite Kingdom 
of Arabia (London: Hurst & Company, 2001), 74-125. For a collection of revisionist views 
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mostly intended to establish a regional suzerainty.109 Notwithstanding, the 
Arab Revolt not only was effective in military terms, but also considerably chal-
lenged Ottoman legitimacy in the Arab provinces. The Arab Revolt created an 
ideological competition between Ottoman and Sharifian claims over Arab-
Muslim solidarity and sovereignty.110
Arab support for Sharif Ḥusayn’s revolt remained limited. While some Otto-
man officers and soldiers with Arab nationalist sentiments joined the Arab 
Revolt, most Arabs in the Ottoman Empire opted for “loyalist federalism”.111 
One of the most prominent figures in the Arab nationalist movement was ʿ Aziz 
ʿAlī al-Miṣrī (who would later become Gamāl ʿAbdel Nāṣṣer’s mentor), a CUP 
member of Circassian-Egyptian origin who was discharged from the Ottoman 
General Staff and forced into exile in Egypt for falling out of favour with Enver 
Pasha before the war.112 Despite being the figurehead of Arab nationalist secret 
societies, ʿAziz ʿAlī did not fully embrace separatism. The secret society al-
Qaḥṭāniyya, founded by ʿAziz ʿAlī, had the policy goal of “turning the Ottoman 
Empire into a dual Monarchy.” According to George Antonius, “The Arab prov-
inces were to form a single kingdom with its own parliament and local govern-
ment and with Arabic as the language of its institutions; the kingdom was to be 
a part of Turko-Arab empire similar in architecture to the Austro-Hungarian 
edifice.”113 The Covenant (al-ʿAhd), another secret, and more militant, society 
founded by ʿAziz ʿAlī, had a similar programme.114 Its first clause declared the 
purpose of the society as “internal independence for the Arab countries 
on the Arab Revolt by Turkish scholars of Ottoman history, see the special issue “Arap 
İsyanı’nın 100. Yılı: İhtilal mi, İhanet mi?”, in Toplumsal Tarih, no. 294 (2018). 
109 Joshua Teitelbaum, “Sharif Husayn ibn Ali and the Hashemite Vision of the Post-Ottoman 
Order: From Chieftaincy to Suzerainty”, MES 34:1 (1998), 103-22.
110 William L. Cleveland, “The Role of Islam as Political Ideology in the First World War”, in 
National and International Politics in the Middle East: Essays in Honour of Elie Kedourie, ed. 
Edward Ingram (London: F. Cass, 1986), 84-101; M. Talha Çiçek, “Visions of Islamic Unity: 
A Comparison of Djemal Pasha’s al-Sharq and Sharīf Ḥusayn’s al-Qibla Periodicals”, WI 
54:3-4 (2014), 460-82.
111 Saab, The Arab Federalists of the Ottoman Empire, 239. It is important to note that only 
those Arab officers joined the Arab Revolt who were recruited from prisoner-of-war 
camps, while desertion to join the insurgents was insignificant among the ranks. Mesut 
Uyar, “Ottoman Arab Officers between Nationalism and Loyalty during the First World 
War”, War in History 20:4 (2013), 526-44. 
112 On ʿAzīz ʿAlī al-Miṣrī, see Majid Khadduri, “Aziz Ali al-Misri and the Arab Nationalist 
Movement”, Middle Eastern Affairs 4 (1965), 140-63.
113 Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 110. On Qaḥṭānīya, see Tauber, The Emergence of the Arab 
Movements, 98-100.
114 Eliezer Tauber, “Secrecy in Early Arab Nationalist Organizations”, MES 33:1 (1997), 119-27. 
See also Tauber, The Emergence of the Arab Movements, 213-36. 
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provided that they remained united with the government of Constantinople as 
Hungary is united with Austria.”115 ʿAziz ʿAlī remembered that later al-ʿAhd “was 
dominated by Arabs whose objectives became openly revolutionary”.116 Young 
Turk leaders, such as Cemal Pasha, were informed about these ideas of the 
Austro-Hungarian model proposed by ʿAziz ʿAli and others; yet, it was rather 
the demand for an autonomous Arab army which was considered unaccept-
able.117 Iraq’s later president Nūrī al-Saʿīd, who joined the Arab Revolt during 
British captivity, confessed many years later:
None of us thought of separation from the Ottoman Empire. Our think-
ing was directed toward obtaining a local Arab administration, the recog-
nition of Arabic as an official language, and Turkish-Arab association in 
the administration of the general policy of the state […] Some Turks, 
among them Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk] […], were supporting this idea.118
During secret negotiations with Cemal Pasha beginning in late 1917, Emir 
Fayṣal, son of Sharif Ḥusayn and the commander of the Arab insurgents, de-
manded in return for his defection a settlement similar to the Austro-Hungar-
ian model, if not the Prussian or Bavarian model in the German Reich.119 
Meanwhile, there were even false rumours that Cemal Pasha was toying with 
the idea of coming to an agreement with the Allies and founding his own sul-
tanate in Anatolia, the Levant, and Mesopotamia, with Damascus as the new 
capital.120 If true, it was very much reminiscent of the Turco-Arab empire envi-
sioned by Colmar von der Goltz, who had died of typhus in Baghdad in April 
1916.121
115 Amin Saʿid, al-Thawra al-ʿarabiyya al-kubrā: Tārīkh mufaṣṣal jāmiʿ li-l-qaḍiyya al-ʻarabiyya 
fī rubʻ qarn (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat ʿIsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1934), vol. I, 46-47, quoted in Saab, The 
Arab Federalists of the Ottoman Empire, 236-37. Emphasis in the original.
116 Khadduri, “Aziz Ali al-Misri and the Arab Nationalist Movement”, 149-50.
117 Djemal Pasha, Memories of a Turkish Statesman, 60. 
118 Nūrī al-Saʿīd’s lecture on the military movements of the Arab army in the Hijaz and Syria, 
Baghdad 1947, quoted in William W. Haddad, “Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire”, in 
Nationalism in a Non-National State: The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, ed. William 
W. Haddad and William Ochsenwald (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977), 19. 
119 Çiçek, War and State Formation in Syria, 63-65; Isaiah Friedman, British Miscalculations: 
The Rise of Muslim Nationalism, 1918-1925 (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2012), 
51; Karsh and Karsh, “Myth in the Desert, or Not the Great Arab Revolt”, 304-05.
120 David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation 
of the Modern Middle East, 20th year anniversary ed. (New York, NY: Henry Holt, 2009), 
214-15. 
121 How von der Goltz’s idea of relocating the Ottoman capital continued to inspire German 
observers is pointed out in Johann Strauss, “The Disintegration of Ottoman Rule in the 
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As part of the wartime propaganda machinery, Turkish-nationalist journals 
such as Türk Yurdu continued to uphold visions and ideals of Turco-Arab unity 
under the Ottoman Caliphate.122 A long poem by Celal Sahir (Erozan) was, for 
instance, published after a propaganda tour to Syria, Palestine, and the Hijaz. 
Celal Sahir’s poem preached that “Turk and Arab are two brothers” and that 
the “homeland” belonged to both of them. For this shared homeland, Turkish 
and Arab bloods were “mixing […] in competition”.123 Celal Sahir would later 
become one of the founding members of Atatürk’s Turkish Language Associa-
tion and play an important role in the Kemalist language reforms aimed at 
purifying Turkish from Arabic loanwords.124 The Syrian-Arab intellectual 
Muḥammad Kurd ʿAlī remained loyal to the Ottoman state throughout the war 
years.125 In his publications, he propagated an “Ottoman commonwealth” in 
which the war effort created among Turks and Arabs “a nation of East and 
West, that combines the old and the new, which defends its domain by force to 
preserve its special character”. Fascinated by the bilingual abilities of people in 
Adana, Muḥammad Kurd ʿAlī stressed: “The best solution for the social-linguis-
tic problem is for the Arabs to become Turkified, and for the Turks to become 
Arabized…. [T]his is inevitable, for Arabic is the tongue of Islam and is im-
mersed in the history of Muslims, while Turkish is the language of politics and 
administration.”126 Ziya Gökalp also remained faithful to his understanding of 
the Ottoman Empire constituting in its social fundaments a Turco-Arab state 
Syrian Territories as Viewed by German Observers”, in The Syrian Land: Processes of 
Integration and Fragmentation Bilād al-Shām from the 18th to the 20th Century, ed. Thomas 
Philipp and Birgit Schäbler (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1998), 308, note 3.
122 According to one recent study of Türk Yurdu, however, “the ideas about the development 
of the state upon Arab and Turkish elements began to be replaced, in conjunction with 
the war, by a model in which the Turkish element was the only dominant figure”. Özgür 
Balkılıç and Deniz Dölek, “Turkish Nationalism at its Beginning: Analysis of Türk Yurdu, 
1913-1918”, Nationalities Papers 41:2 (2013), 316-33.
123 Celal Sahir (Erozan), “Kardaşlık Türküsü: Arab Genclerine”, Türk Yurdu 11:10 (1332 [1917]), 
3297-3298. According to a footnote by the editors, the poem was also published in the 
Arabic newspaper Beyrūt (1916). See also Yusuf H. Bayur, Türk İnkılabı Tarihi, 3rd ed. 
(Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1991), IIId, 492. 
124 Geoffrey L. Lewis, The Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 45-46. 
125 On Muḥammad Kurd ʿAlī during the war years, see Salim Tamari, “Muhammad Kurd Ali 
and the Syrian-Palestinian Intelligentsia in the Ottoman Campaign against Arab 
Separatism”, in Syria in World War I: Politics, Economy and Society, ed. M. Talha Çiçek (New 
York: Routledge, 2016), 37-60; Rainer Hermann, Kulturkrise und konservative Erneuerung: 
Muḥammad Kurd ʿAlī (1876-1953) und das geistige Leben in Damaskus zu Beginn des 20. 
Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1990), 124-36.
126 Quoted in Tamari, The Great War and the Remaking of Palestine, 77. 
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and advised Talat to reorganize the Ottoman state accordingly.127 Gökalp re-
peated his ideas in an article published in Yeni Mecmua, on March 14, 1918, 
while the Arab insurgents and the British Army were closing in on Damascus. 
At this critical hour, Gökalp argued in similar terms as he had done before the 
war. He defined Muslim nationalism as a prerequisite for Turkish and Arab 
nationalism in the face of colonial threats:
Within the Ottoman state, there are only two national countries that 
 possess the ability for social synthesis, the first one being Anatolia as a 
Turkish country and the second, Arabia. These two countries, which are 
both peninsulas, are required to live under a political union due to their 
geographical situation. These geographical necessities go together with 
religious requirements. Because for Muslim nations, first religious inde-
pendence must be secured before national independence. If Turks and 
Arabs are politically divided, the religious independence of both is in 
danger in the first place. However, these two nations have accepted that 
the spirit and essence of independence demand foremost not to be sub-
jected to non-Muslim rule. Muslim nations can only consider national 
independence after religious independence is provided. This means, they 
first desire to be free as a community [ümmetçe] and then to be autono-
mous as a nation, because their common enemies are always waiting for 
the opportunity to take away their most holy religious independence.128
Insomuch as there was a propagandistic motivation in such Ottoman-Turkish 
publications, it would be a fallacy to dismiss them only as a façade. They 
were part of a continued line of political thought since the Balkan Wars. Mem-
ories of the war lent credibility to the perceived potential of a settlement with 
the Arabs. One of the most influential voices in the formulation of the Kemal-
ist historiographical narrative, Falih Rıfkı (Atay), who was Cemal Pasha’s aide-
de-camp in Syria and Mustafa Kemal’s friend, did not fail to take note of the 
special place of Arabs in the eyes of the Young Turks, even during the later 
stages of the war. While the CUP’s Turkism was irreconcilable with Armenian 
and Kurdish demands, as Falih Rıfkı argued, “It was not impossible to make a 
127 Çiçek, War and State Formation in Syria, 65. Ahmet Emin Yalman noted in 1930 that 
Gökalp “openly advocated Arabian independence and the formation of a new federation 
in which Turks and Arabs should participate as two independent states.” Ahmet Emin 
Yalman, Turkey in the World War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), 208.
128 Ziya Gökalp, “Milliyetcilik ve Beynelmileliyetcilik”, Yeni Mecmua, 14 March 1918, quoted in 
Bayur, Türk İnkılabı Tarihi, IIId, 493-495. 
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federation between the Arabs of the Hijaz, Syria and Iraq and the Turks of Ana-
tolia and Thrace”. When Mustafa Kemal visited him in Syria in 1917, Rıfkı “real-
ized, after listening to what Mustafa Kemal was saying, that he too was very 
inclined to these opinions”.129 In a secret letter to the commanding officer of 
the Fourth Army in Syria in the final months of the war, Fayṣal repeated his 
plea to settle for a federative solution:
Arabs do not demand anything from the Turks. But they want to live in 
freedom. They wish to work together with the Turks. For this, they have 
recently made a very definitive and undisputable offer.
 I am declaring this to your government. “The Arabs are demanding 
from you the status of Bavaria in relation to Prussia.” This offer will unite 
the hearts of the two nations, and I call any other condition less than this 
the murder of these two Muslim nations. Because soon military courts 
and executions will resume. Through the hands of the foreigners, upris-
ing against the sultan will be proposed, and false fatwas will be investi-
gated. In the end, hardship and disasters will begin over and over again.
 Sir, if the government of Turkey accepts the terms proposed by the Ar-
abs, I respectfully declare that we are ready to negotiate.130
Even if wartime propaganda muddied the waters, voices and visions of Turco-
Arab solidarity were loud and clear in the cacophony and chaos of the Great 
War. Between the Young Turk jihad and the Arab Revolt, most Turkists sought 
reconciliation with the Arabs, while most Arabists were hoping to settle for a 
“decentralized Sultanate”.131
The Federalist Moment in Post-Ottoman National Struggles
In November 1918, during armistice negotiations with the Seventh Otto-
man Army in the city of Qatma, the aforementioned Nūrī al-Saʿīd from the 
British-Arab delegation gave a secret letter to a Turkish officer whom he had 
129 Falih Rıfkı Atay, Çankaya: Atatürk’ün Doğumundan Ölümüne Kadar (Istanbul: Pozitif 
Yayınları, 2004), 140-41.
130 Fayṣal, letter to Mersinli Cemal, 12 August 1918, Library of Congress, Washington DC, John 
D. Whiting Papers, box 17, folder 9, quoted – by courtesy of Zachary Forster – in M. Şükrü 
Hanioğlu, “Arap Milliyetçilerinin Osmanlı’ya Son Teklifi: ‘Siz Prusya Olun, Biz Bavyera’”, 
Derin Tarih 28 (2014), 124-28. A slightly different version of the same letter is quoted in 
Cevat Rifat Atilhan, “Görünmeyen İnkılap [10]”, Büyük Doğu 34 (1950), 10.
131 Masters, The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 223.
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befriended. The letter was addressed to Grand Vizier Ahmed İzzet (Furgaç) 
Pasha, who took over the government after the Ottoman surrender, and the 
letter proposed a Muslim federation of Turks and Arabs against the colonial 
ambitions of the British and the French. These terms were practically a con-
tinuation of Fayṣal’s secret correspondence with Ottoman officials, given the 
fact that Nūrī al-Saʿīd was Fayṣal’s right-hand man. The commander of  Qatma, 
Ali Fuad (Cebesoy) Pasha, however, dismissed it as British intrigue and did not 
forward the letter to the capital.132 What Ali Fuad did not know was that, at the 
same time, a similar proposal for the post-war settlement was presented by 
Grand Vizier Ahmed İzzet Pasha to the Allied forces. The second clause re-
quired that “Syria and Iraq will remain under our [Ottoman] rule with a special 
administration based on internal autonomy and an alliance in the form of pre-
war Hungary with Austria.”133 This fleeting opportunity of establishing a Turco-
Arab dual monarchy at the end of the First World War was missed. Yet, Turks 
and Arabs envisioned Turco-Arab co-existence in ever more federalist terms. 
Considering that the post-war period particularly marks an important episode 
in grand narratives of national awakenings, revisionist studies illustrate the 
connections that united Turkish and Arab insurgents in resisting the European 
occupation.134 In the crisis of the post-Ottoman settlement, there was a brief 
federalist moment that defined the momentum of Turco-Arab relations be-
tween Anatolia, Syria, and Iraq.135
In August 1919, British intelligence were informed of a secret treaty be-
tween Mustafa Kemal and Fayṣal, signed by intermediaries on June 16, 1919, in 
Aleppo. British officials immediately assumed that it was a forgery fabricated 
132 Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Milli Mücadele Hatıraları (Istanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2000), 84-85. See 
also Sina Akşin, “Turkish-Syrian Relations in the Time of Faysal (1918-20)”, Turkish 
Yearbook of International Relations 20 (1980-81), 1-17. Nūrī al-Saʿīd was arguably still 
influenced by Ottomanist ideas of decentralism while he was trying to enact a pan-Arab 
federation in 1936 and 1943. Helmut Mejcher, “Der arabische Osten im zwanzigsten 
Jahrhundert 1914-1985”, in Geschichte der arabischen Welt, ed. Ulrich W. Haarmann 
(München: C.H. Beck, 4th ed., revised and enlarged, 2001), 481. 
133 Ahmet İzzet Furgaç, Feryadım, 2 vols., ed. Süheyl İ. Furgaç and Yüksel Kanar (Istanbul: 
Nehir Yayınları, 1992-1993), I, 205. 
134 Michael Provence, “Ottoman Modernity, Colonialism, and Insurgency in the Interwar 
Arab East”, IJMES 43:2 (2011), 205-25; Alp Yenen, “The ‘Young Turk Zeitgeist’ in the Middle 
Eastern Uprisings in the Aftermath of World War I”, in War and Collapse: World War I and 
the Ottoman State, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz and Feroz Ahmad (Salt Lake City: University of 
Utah Press, 2016), 1181-1216.
135 This federalist moment was part of the “Pan-Islamic Moment of 1918-1924”, as described in 
Cemil Aydın, The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2017), 122-27. For a detailed history of Turco-Arab relations in 
this period, see Polat, Türk-Arap İlişkileri, 181-275. 
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by Cilician Armenians to provoke a European intervention, but there is reason 
to believe it was authentic.136 Its first clause proclaimed that “the Turkish and 
Arabic races which have material, moral and religious bonds between them are 
in duty bound to help each other towards perfect agreement in matters of reli-
gion and country.”137 “At the same time I do not believe that such a treaty ex-
ists”, commented a British intelligence officer in Cairo, “though C.U.P. would no 
doubt like to conclude it”.138 This assumption was not wrong. The CUP, whose 
leaders had disappeared into a clandestine exile in Berlin, and its remnant un-
derground networks in Turkey were busy organizing and mobilizing an armed 
resistance. Moreover, Arab leaders in Syria and the “Kemalist” leadership in 
Anatolia were working towards a Turco-Arab rapprochement in late 1919. Cev-
det Pasha, the Commander of the Sixth Army (later Thirteenth Army Corps), 
described his political vision for the future of the Arab provinces in what one 
might call the United States of the Ottoman Caliphate:
Therefore, it is possible in every way for the Ottoman Government to 
come to terms with the formation of a confederation, once the peoples of 
Iraq, Syria, the Hejaz, and the Arab Peninsula have each formed their gov-
ernment and reaffirmed their attachment to the holy person of His Maj-
esty the Caliph. Then, crescents of the Ottoman flag will symbolize the 
governments as in the stars of the American flag.139
Cevdet Pasha was not alone in envisioning such a future, because most Young 
Turks, both the leaders of the CUP abroad and the Kemalist leadership in Ana-
tolia, entertained similar ideas. Former Ottoman deputy of Hawran Emir 
Shakīb Arslān, who was trusted by the Young Turk leaders for being a CUP 
136 Abdul-Karim Rafeq, “Arabism, Society, and Economy in Syria 1918-1920”, in State and 
Society in Syria and Lebanon, ed. Youssef M. Choueiri (New York: St. Martinʼs Press, 1994), 
7-11, argues that “there are indications that the treaty could have been genuine.” Isaiah 
Friedman believes the treaty represented aspirations rather than a signed agreement. 
Friedman, British Miscalculations, 50-55. Hadiye Yılmaz showed that Mustafa Kemal had 
seen this treaty as a draft but did not sign it. Hadiye Yılmaz, “Mustafa Kemal Paşa-Emir 
Faysal Anlaşması ve Milli Mücadele Döneminde Suriye ve Irak”, Cum huriyet Tarihi 
Araştırmaları Dergisi 10:20 (2014), 289-306.
137 English translation of the secret treaty between Mustafa Kemal and Fayṣal, annex to FO, 
371/4233, 123318, in Bilal N. Şimşir, ed., British Documents on Atatürk (1919-1938), Vol.1: April 
1919 - March 1920 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1973), 81-84.
138 French, telegraph (Cairo) to Curzon (London), 3 September 1919, FO, 371/4233, no. 417, in 
ibid., 92.
139 Cevdet (Diyarbekir), letter to Committee of Representatives of Amasya, 16-17 October 
1919, in Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, 10th ed. (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1969), III, 
1104. 
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loyalist and a pan-Islamic activist throughout the war, was approached by 
Fayṣal’s emissaries in Switzerland. Fayṣal was by then the leader of the Syrian 
provisional government. The Syrian national government was looking for ways 
to get in touch with the Anatolian resistance movement. There was a great 
need for arms and ammunition in the Syrian resistance against the French oc-
cupation. Arabs were even ready to look for support from Soviet Russia.140 Brit-
ish intelligence reported that Arslān declared in an intercepted letter to Maxim 
Litvinov, the leading Soviet diplomat in Europe, that “all [Arab] hatred against 
the Turk had been dispelled and all that was now wanted was mutual trust and 
combination in support of the common cause.”141 One of the aforementioned 
leaders of the Arab Revolt, ʿAzīz ʿAlī al-Miṣrī, visited Talat Pasha in Berlin in 
December 1919 and told him that, due to the poor governance of the Entente, it 
was now possible for the Arabs in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq to form “a federal gov-
ernment” with the Turks.142 Cooperation with Arabs in the form of a Muslim-
nationalist league was one of the major items on the agenda of the exiled 
Young Turk leadership.143 While having secret negotiations with British agents, 
Talat and Enver demanded that Turkey must be “fully independent” and “in the 
future, if Arabs desired, not to hinder a Turco-Arab confederation.”144 Talat be-
lieved that they could profit from men like ʿAzīz ʿAlī and even attached a mes-
sage from the latter to his first letter to Mustafa Kemal.145 Although ʿAzīz ʿAlī’s 
letter is lost, Mustafa Kemal answered that ʿAzīz ʿAlī would be of great use in 
the “Arab affairs” of the Anatolian movement, but he could not provide any 
140 Shakīb Arslān, letter (Berne) to Enver (Berlin), 11 December 1919, in Murat Bar dakçı, ed., 
İttihadçı’nın Sandığı: İttihat ve Terakki Liderlerinin Özel Arşivlerindeki Yayın lanmamış Bel-
geler ile Atatürk ve İnönü Dönemlerinde Ermeni Gayrimenkulleri Konusunda Alınmış Bazı 
Kararlar (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2013), 475.
141 N.N.E. Bray, Preliminary Report on Causes of Unrest in Mesopotamia, September 1920, 
FO, 371/5230, E-12339, 4-5. For Shakīb Arslān’s letter see India Office, report (Switzerland) 
to Foreign Office concerning the alleged intrigues of Fayṣal with the Bolsheviks, 10 Febru-
ary 1920, FO, 371/5032, E-21.2.44, quoted in Zeine N. Zeine, The Struggle for Arab Indepen-
dence: Western Diplomacy and the Rise and Fall of Faisal’s Kingdom in Syria (Delamr: Cara-
van, 1977), 134-35. 
142 Talat, letter (Berlin) to Cemal (Munich), 21 December 1919, in Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın and 
Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu, eds., İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları: Bir Devri Aydınlatan 
Tarihi Mektuplar (Istanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2002), 186.
143 Alp Yenen, “The Young Turk Aftermath: Making Sense of Transnational Contentious 
Politics at the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1918-1922” (PhD thesis, University of Basel, 
2016, published online in 2019) URL: <https://doi.org/10.5451/unibas-007110817>.
144 Talat (Berlin), letter to Cavid (Switzerland), 6 December 1920, in Yalçın and Kocahanoğlu, 
İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 147.
145 Talat, letter (Berlin) to Mustafa Kemal (Ankara), 22 December 1919, in ibid., 206.
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material support due to lack of resources.146 In his reply, Talat Pasha reported 
that the exiled Young Turks were approached by an emissary of Fayṣal. Accord-
ing to Talat, “Arabs have been totally disillusioned after the armistice”, because:
The [Sykes-Picot] agreement signed in 1916 between the French and the 
English partitions the entirety of Arabia and makes a laughing stock of it 
[parçalayıp kuşa benzetiyor]. And for an independent Arabia it leaves 
nothing but desert behind. Someone from the entourage of Amir Fayṣal 
said in a conversation with one of us in Switzerland that the Arab youth 
[al-Fatāt? AY] would forget about the past and would prefer to unite with 
the Turks like old Germany or Austria-Hungary and cooperate [with the 
Turks] to hinder the occupation by the Allies.147
Talat believed that Arabs should “demonstrate that they wish to unite with the 
Turks”, so that “the power of the Caliphate continues and survives in that area”. 
One policy option which Talat proposed to Mustafa Kemal was to “create an 
organization, which would make a Turco-Arab union possible by capitalizing 
the current desperation of the Arabs, and which would generally create a trend 
within the Muslim world for our [Turkey’s] benefit.”148 Mustafa Kemal, in his 
answer to Talat, acknowledged ongoing Turco-Arab relations but was rather 
pessimistic about their actual promise:
For a long time, relations have been established with Syrians and Iraqis 
and joint actions are set against the English and French.
 Decisions have been made with legitimate Arab delegates who ap-
proached us in order to proceed a joint operation under more strict prin-
ciples. The formula that we proposed to the Arabs as before is as follows:
 To unite in the form of a confederation, once each nation has estab-
lished independence. Arabs delightfully accepted this principle.
 Even Emir Fayṣal’s trustees have approached us to unite under this 
principle. The thought and the possibility that Fayṣal might be following 
a secret policy on behalf of the French makes us proceed cautiously.149
Protocols of the closed session of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara at-
test that Mustafa Kemal signalled his readiness for “federative or 
146 Mustafa Kemal attached his answer to ʿAzīz ʿAlī in his letter (Ankara) to Talat Pasha 
(Berlin), 29 February 1920, in ibid., 219.
147 Talat, letter (Berlin) to Mustafa Kemal (Ankara), 22 December 1919, in ibid., 205-06. 
148 Ibid., 206-07.
149 Mustafa Kemal, letter (Ankara) to Talat (Berlin), 29 February 1920, in ibid., 211-12.
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confederative” solutions to Fayṣal’s emissaries but had no resources to offer to 
their help.150 As he later told a Soviet emissary, Mustafa Kemal supported Arab 
national struggles, but he was distrustful towards the monarchical ambitions 
of Fayṣal.151 Meanwhile, Arab nationalists in Syria were sceptical of Fayṣal’s 
policies and instead of him, al-Fatāt (Young Arab Society) and other popular 
societies dominated local politics.152 Mustafa Kemal’s pragmatic approach to 
confederation of Muslim-nationalist movements in the neighbouring Arab 
lands was not much different from his feelings for fellow Turkic-Muslim strug-
gles in the Caucasus:
As you can understand from the formula I used in the alliance with the 
Arabs and the instructions I gave to our friends in the Caucasus, what I 
have in mind is that we should provoke the various Muslim masses 
against those enemies of Turkey so that they obtain independence. By 
this means, their autonomous employment can lighten the burden of the 
pressure put on Turkey and can produce maximum advantage for its ma-
terial and moral strength. Then in the future we can unite in a confedera-
tion with those Muslim masses that safeguarded their independence. So 
far, the work that was invested manifests a result that seems to be gratify-
ing.153
Shortly before, during the Arab raid on British troops in Dayr al-Zor on Decem-
ber 11, 1919, and the following Turkish campaign against French in Cilicia in 
January 20, 1920, there were many contacts between Turkish and Arab insur-
gents. Not without reason, British officials speculated that these two attacks 
were connected, if not coordinated.154
150 Speech at the closed session of the Grand National Assembly, 24 April 1920, Türkiye Büyük 
Millet Meclisi Gizli Celse Zabıtları, Devre I, Cilt I, 3. See also Yılmaz, “Mustafa Kemal Paşa-
Emir Faysal Anlaşması ve Milli Mücadele Döneminde Suriye ve Irak”, 300.
151 Y.Y. Upmal-Angarski, interview (Ankara) with Mustafa Kemal, 1 January 1921, in Mehmet 
Perinçek, Atatürk’ün Sovyetler’le Görüşmeleri: Sovyet Arşiv Belgeleriyle (Istanbul: Kaynak 
Yayınları, 2005), 259.
152 Eliezer Tauber, The Formation of Modern Syria and Iraq (Essex: Frank Cass, 1995), 11-48. On 
popular politics in pre-mandate Syria, see James L. Gelvin, Divided Loyalties: Nationalism 
and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire (California: University of California Press, 
1999).
153 Mustafa Kemal, letter (Ankara) to Talat (Berlin), 29 February 1920, in Yalçın and Koca ha-
noğlu, İttihatçı Liderlerin Gizli Mektupları, 213.
154 Polat, Türk-Arap İlişkileri, 247-48. See also Eisuke Naramoto, “An Introductory Note on 
Military Alliance between the Arab and Turkish Nationalists 1919-1920: Dayr az-Zūr Raid 
and the Cilicia Campaign”, Annals of Japan Association for Middle East Studies 1 (1986), 
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The reasoning behind this federalist moment in the midst of national strug-
gles was seen both by Turks and Arabs as a necessary strategy against colonial 
occupation and partition. In a report to the Ankara government, president of 
the Committee of the Defence of the National Rights of Syria and Palestine 
and the district governor of ʿ Ayntab, Özdemir Bey, reported that Arab national-
ists had accepted the offer by Mustafa Kemal to establish a confederation with 
the Turks after recognizing their governmental deficit in the face of colonial 
occupation.155 “Lloyd George’s proposal to partition Turkey”, a Turkish military 
intelligence note from February 1920 concluded, “will result in the revolt of the 
Muslim world and in the future [increase] the danger of a union of Turks with 
Bolsheviks and Arabs.”156
An emissary from the General Syrian Congress, Saʿīd Haidar, a member of 
the Fatāt, was sent in spring 1920 with a secret delegation to Turkey to contact 
Mustafa Kemal Pasha. In an interview Saʿīd Haidar stated later that, while in 
Istanbul, they met with representatives of Mustafa Kemal, who was by then in 
Anatolia, and agreed to fight the colonial occupation. The fourth and last point 
of the agreement said:
(4) In the event of the successful outcome of their efforts against the 
West, the Arabs and the Turks will live side by side in two independent 
states but their relations will be nearly in the same line as the relations of 
Austria and Hungary in the pre-War Austro-Hungarian Empire. This rela-
tionship will be governed by a Treaty to last for fifty years.157
In the Turkish military archives, there is a five-point manuscript of a similar 
treaty of Turco-Arab cooperation guaranteeing that “Arabs are free to deter-
217-52; Eliezer Tauber, “Syrian and Iraqi Nationalist Attitudes to the Kemalist and 
Bolshevik Movements”, MES 30:4 (1994): 898-907. 
155 Quoted in M. Talha Çiçek, “Osmanlıcılık İdeolojisi ve Osmanlı Hakimiyeti Sonrası Türk-
Arap İlişkilerinde Değişim ve Süreklilik”, Divan: Disiplinler Arası Çalışmalar Dergisi 17:33 
(2012), 173-92. On Özdemir see also Othman Ali, “The Career of Ozdemir: A Turkish Bid for 
Northern Iraq, 1921-1923”, MES 53:6 (2017), 966-85.
156 İsmail (14. Army Corps), intelligence report to 20. Army Corps, 10 February 1920, Archive 
of the Institute of the Turkish Revolution History (Türkiye İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü), 
University of Ankara, kutu no. 318, gömlek no. 51.
157 Zeine, The Struggle for Arab Independence, 135. Whether this Saʿīd Haidar is Rustum 
Haidar from the Fatāt is not clear. Tauber, The Emergence of the Arab Movements, 90-97. 
This agreement was not ratified by Fayṣal, who allegedly feared a Bolshevik intervention 
through the Kemalists and that the Kemalists might come to an agreement with the 
French. FO, 371/5036, E-7174 in Bilal N. Şimşir, ed., British Documents on Atatürk (1919-1938), 
Vol. 2: April 1919 – December 1920 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1975), 156-57. See 
also Rafeq, “Arabism, Society, and Economy in Syria”, 10. 
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mine their own destiny” and that “Turkish and Arab nations accept only inde-
pendence for their administration” in their struggle against “foreign invasion” 
(ecnebi işgali) by means of “joint operation” (tevhid-i harekat ederler) and 
“helping each other” (yekdiğerine muavenet eder).158
Another attempt to establish a cooperation, if not a confederation, between 
Arabs and Turks during the Turkish War of Independence was initiated by 
Rashīd Riḍā. As a member of the Syrian National Congress, he sent a letter to 
Mustafa Kemal Pasha including a joint memorandum of the Syrian-Arab com-
mittees.159 The letter was sent with a Syrian courier who had served under the 
command of Mustafa Kemal. In Mersin, he handed the letter to the head of 
military intelligence, to be delivered to Mustafa Kemal in Ankara. In this letter, 
Rashīd Riḍā advised Mustafa Kemal
to do whatever is required to strengthen the Turk, while still maintaining 
the bond of Islam, and cooperation with the Arabs states, because if that 
unity with the Arabs is lost, even if it were in Syria or Iraq alone, that 
would be disastrous for the Turks.160
In face of the uncertainties of the armed struggles against the colonial settle-
ment and the complex interplay with the Great Powers in the region, these 
negotiations between Turks and Arabs were probably discontinued or re-
mained practically only on paper due to a lack of resources. Fayṣal was de-
feated by the French at the Battle of Maysalun on July 24, 1920. He was later 
crowned king in the British mandate of Iraq. With the Turco-French settle-
ment in September 1921, the border between Turkey and the French mandate 
of Syria was practically drawn, even though cross-border relations between 
Anatolia and Greater Syria continued to connect the post-Ottoman territories 
during the interwar years.161 The border with Iraq remained disputed longer 
158 Archive of the Turkish General Staff ’s Directorate for Military History and Strategic 
Studies (Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı), Ankara, İstiklal Harbi 
Kolleksiyonu, kutu no. 641, gömlek no. 103.
159 A declaration of solidarity and alliance by Syrian nationalists was published in the official 
newspaper of the Turkish national movement, Hakimiyet-i Milliye, October 1920, cited in 
Metin Hülagü, İslam Birliği ve Mustafa Kemal: İngiliz Gizli Belgelerine Göre Milli 
Mücadelede İslamcılık ve Turancılık (Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2008), 81. 
160 This episode is mentioned by Rashīd Riḍā in a letter to Shakīb Arslān, 28 January 1926, in 
Shakīb Arslān, al-Sayyid Rashid̄ Riḍā, aw ikhāʼ arbaʿin̄ sana (Damascus: Ibn Zaydūn, 1937), 
435. 
161 Keith D. Watenpaugh, Being Modern in the Middle East: Revolution, Nationalism, Colo-
nialism, and the Arab Middle Class (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 160-84; 
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due to the Mosul question, but it was eventually decided in 1926. On the eve of 
the Treaty of Lausanne, a delegation of Palestinians went so far as to demand 
“complete independence under the Turkish Mandate”.162 There was general 
mourning over the lost empire. Farīd Qaṣṣāb, an Arab nationalist, noted with 
sorrow: “The Ottoman Empire should have been decentralized, not dismem-
bered.”163 Yet, post-Ottoman people continued their lives in new nation-states. 
The new regimes not only shaped the horizon of expectation but also forced a 
cleansing of memories of imperial multinationalism.
 Conclusion
The CUP regime’s agency was certainly at fault in the ultimate collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire and in the destruction and displacement of many Ottoman 
communities. The Ottoman-Muslim visions of a Turco-Arab co-existence in-
tended to save the empire, yet they also accompanied the end of co-existence 
of Muslims and non-Muslims in an “ecumenical Ottomanism”.164 Assuming 
that nationalism alone was to blame for the demise of Ottomanism falsely sug-
gests that there was a struggle between political ideologies that determined 
the outcome of history. As such, the commonplace argument takes for granted 
that Turkish and Arab nationalism prevailed over Ottomanism, pan-Islamism, 
liberalism, and federalism because nationalism was the strongest and fiercest 
ideology of the time. In explaining the evolution of historical processes, how-
ever, one must address the fluidity and the multiplicity of identities as well as 
the role of contingencies, chaos, and complexities in forming ideas and ideolo-
gies. Hence, many nationalists, whether they were adherents of Turkism or 
Arabism, continued to uphold the Ottoman Empire and look for ways to unite 
and live with each other – especially, in times of crisis.
Contrary to received wisdom, envisioning Turco-Arab co-existence was 
not marginal or circumstantial. Instead, various models were considered, pro-
Cyrus Schayegh, The Middle East and the Making of the Modern World (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2017), 132-91; Amit Bein, Kemalist Turkey and the Middle East: 
International Relations in the Interwar Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017), 25-61.
162 Awad Halabi, “Liminal Loyalties: Ottomanism and Palestinian Responses to the Turkish 
War of Independence, 1919-22”, Journal of Palestine Studies 41:3 (2012), 19-37.
163 Stefan Wild, “Ottomanism versus Arabism: The Case of Farid Kassab (1884-1970)”, WI 
28:1/4 (1988), 607-27.
164 Makdisi, Age of Coexistence, 86.
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posed, and propagated by many prominent Ottoman opinion-makers – both 
Turks and Arabs. The peculiar trajectory of Colmar von der Goltz’s proposal of 
a Turco-Arab empire and his call to relocate the Ottoman capital to Turco-Arab 
borderlands illustrate how and when such ideas travelled across time and 
space. Goltz Pasha’s singular influence aside, envisioning models of Turco-Ar-
ab co-existence was obviously connected to times of crisis. Loss of territories to 
the West pushed both Arabs and Turks to reconsider their transnational rela-
tionship in defensive and conservative terms. Muslim-nationalist sentiments 
of solidarity and sovereignty were the motives for envisioning such models of 
Turco-Arab co-existence. This was the case after the Balkan Wars and during 
the colonial partition of the Ottoman realms after World War I. Going back to 
Hassan Saab’s study of Ottoman-Arab federalists, the Austro-Hungarian model 
was popular because it resembled the familiar ideas of Muslim solidarity un-
der the imagined Caliphate “as an institution theoretically centralized and 
practically decentralized, […] because it made an empire ‘at once a league and 
a unitary state’”.165
Self-proclaimed proponents of Turkism and Arabism expressed their politi-
cal visions through a similar set of imaginary and terminology based on their 
collective experience in their shared political space. The interpretation that 
these opinion-makers were only ostensibly supporters of Turco-Arab co-exis-
tence, because they were nationalists at heart and opportunists in practice, is 
only another attempt to impose teleological bias and methodological national-
ism. These multiple and entangled debates were anchored in the space of ex-
perience and horizon of expectation of their particular time. Writing on the 
commonplace dismissal of Ottomanism, Fabio Grassi brought up an empathic 
reminder:
Do these authors deserve to be overlooked? Are their writings no more 
than a patchwork of childish fancies? Maybe, but these must be, in the 
case, conclusions and not aprioristic convictions. And what if the project 
of a current, real European Union collapses? Shall we then consider the 
works of the European federalist thinkers and activists a patchwork of 
childish fancies devoid of any intellectual worth and interest?166
165 Saab, The Arab Federalists of the Ottoman Empire, 242. 
166 Fabio L. Grassi, “An Anti-Nationalistic Dream: Ottomanism”, in Empires and Nations from 
the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century, ed. Antonello Biagini and Giovanna Motta 
(Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), 80.
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“Thinking about what could have been”, as Erik Jan Zürcher noted, “makes us 
more sensitive to processes and contingencies that we too easily overlook 
when we already know how the story ends.”167 Looking at paths not taken, ide-
as not followed, calculations miscalculated, intentions not put into action, and 
actions that have failed is one of the ways for historians to offer a more com-
plex picture of post-imperial transitions.
167 Erik J. Zürcher, “Turning Points and Missed Opportunities in the Modern History of 
Turkey: Where Could Things Have Gone Differently?”, in The Young Turk Legacy and 
Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk’s Turkey (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 
294-95. 
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